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RELIEF FROM PREJUDICIAL JOINDER
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Lester B. Orfield*
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Relief From
Prejudicial Joinder," provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced
by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or infor-
mation or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an
election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants
or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
I. HISTORY OF DRAFTING RULE 14
The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, dated September
8, 1941, contained several provisions on relief from prejudicial joinder. Rule
20(b) provided: "The court may order such separation of joint defendants or
such groups of joint defendants in separate trials as shall be conducive to a fair
trial for each defendant and for the government." The rule was modeled to a
slight extent on Rule 20(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 21, entitled
"Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Defendants," provided:
Misjoinder of defendants is not a ground for dismissal of a
criminal proceeding. Defendants may be dropped, or in proceedings
by information or by complaint defendants may be added, by order
of the court on motion of any defendant or of its own initiative, at
any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as are just. Any pro-
ceeding against a defendant may be severed at any time and pro-
ceeded with separately.
This was modeled to a considerable degree on Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Rule 42(b) provided under the heading, "Separate Trials": "The court
in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial
of any defendant, or of any separate issue or of any number of defendants or
issues." The rule was modeled largely on Rule 42(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A number of suggestions were offered to the Advisory Committee. The
Committee for the Eastern District of Alabama proposed that if there is mis-
joinder of defendants, misjoinder of offenses, or duplicity, the indictment is not
invalid but the court may order severance of the indictment into separate in-
dictments or counts and, if the court believes separate trials would promote
substantial justice when there is a misjoinder of defendants, it may order separate
trials. The Committee for the District of Colorado suggested that motions for
severance should be allowed the government only in cases involving the death
penalty. The Committee for the District of New Jersey would leave the matter
of separate trials on joint indictments to the discretion of the court.
Rule 31(b) of the second draft, dated January 12, 1942, was the same as
Rule 20(b) of the first draft and bore the title, "Joint or Separate Trials of
*A.B., M.A., LL.B., S.J.D.; Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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Defendants." The comment of the reporter pointed out that severance is within
the discretion of the trial court, and its action on a motion for severance will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse. The proposed rule would
not change existing law. Existing law is sound as in some cases severance is
necessary in the interests of justice; and the trial court is best able, in its sound
discretion, to determine when a case should be severed. Rule 32 provided:
"Misjoinder of defendants is not ground for dismissal of a criminal proceeding.
Defendants may be dropped, or in proceedings by informations defendants may
be added by order of the Court. Any proceedings against a defendant may be
severed by the court." The reporter in his comment pointed out that the rule
makes certain that misjoinder of defendants will not require dismissal of an
indictment, but protects the defendant by permitting a severance if he is mis-
joined with others. It also allows defendants to be added to an information,
but not to an indictment.
Rule 31(b) of the third draft, dated March 4, 1942, provided to the same
effect as Rule 31(b) of the second draft, except that it omitted the following
words which had appeared at the end of the sentence: "for each defendant
and for the government." Rule 32 bore a new title, "Misjoinder and Severance."
It provided: "Misjoinder of defendants is not ground for dismissal of a criminal
proceeding. The court may sever any proceeding against a defendant" The
second sentence in Rule 32 of the second draft, on dropping and adding de-
fendants, was omitted.
Rule 9(c) of the fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942, replaced Rule 31(b)
of the third draft. It was entitled, "Separate Trials of Defendants and of
Charges." It provided: "The court may order the separation for trial of de-
fendants or of one or more counts of at indictment or information or of a
consolidated proceeding, if justice requires." Rule 10, entitled "Misjoinder of
Defendants or of Charges," replaced Rule 32. It provided: "In case of mis-
joinder of defendants or of charges, the court shall, as justice requires, separate
defendants or charges or dismiss the indictment or any charge therein as to one
or more defendants."
A draft, known as Preliminary Draft, dated May, 1942, was submitted to
the Supreme Court for comment. Rule 9(c) provided: "Whenever justice re-
quires the court may order separate trials for one or more defendants charged
together or may order separate trials of one or more counts of an indictment or
information." Rule 10 provided: "Whenever justice requires, in cases of mis-
joinder of defendants or of charges, the court shall separate defendants or
charges or dismiss the indictments or information or any charge therein as to
one or more defendants." The Supreme Court made no comment as to Rule 10.
With respect to Rule 9 the Court asked whether any study of the abuse of
indictments drawn with an excessive number of counts had been made.
The fifth draft, dated June 1942, made no changes. The sixth draft,
dated Fall 1942, made some important changes. Rules 9(c) and 10 of the
fifth draft were combined into a new Rule 13. The reason for the combina-
tion was that the same subject matter was involved. The reason for defer-
ment in position was that the rule on prejudicial joinder was thereby placed
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in the procedural position in which such objections commonly are raised
by the defendants and are considered by the court, together with other matters
of defense and of preparation for trial. Rule 13 was entitled, "Prejudicial Joinder
of Offenses or of Defendants." It provided:
If it appears that a defendant or the government may be
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indict-
ment or information or. in a trial, whether by a multiplicity of
counts or of defendants or otherwise, the court at any time upon
motion of the defendant, of the government, or of its own motion
may dismiss an indictment or information or one or more counts
thereof, order an election of counts, grant a severance of de-
fendants, and provide whatever other relief is required.
The reporter pointed out in his memorandum to the Advisory Committee
that "multiplicity of counts" is expressly mentioned as a source of prejudice for
which relief may be provided by the court in one or more specified or unspecified
ways. The Supreme Court had asked whether a study had been made "of the
abuse of indictments drawn with an excessive number of counts." The research
by the Advisory Committee indicated that, under the criminal rule as then
planned, the trial judge would have the responsibility for correcting any such
abuse, and that no arbitrary limits should be placed on the number of counts
which may be included on an indictment. Experience in the United States and
England with efforts to fix arbitrary limits by legislation has not been successful.
The first preliminary draft (seventh committee draft), dated May, 1943,
changed the number of the Rule to 14 and gave it the present title, "Relief from
Prejudicial Joinder." It provided:
If it appears that a defendant or the government may be
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment
or information or in a trial whether by multiplicity of counts or of
defendants or otherwise, the court at any time upon motion of the
defendant, of the government, or of its own motion may order an
election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants,
and provide whatever other relief justice may require.
The former language as to dismissal was deleted. Provision for separate trial
of counts was made.
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee: Judge
A. Lee Wyman of the United States District Court of South Dakota thought
that the motion for election, separate trial or severance should be made before
the trial commences.' To allow such motions to be made at any time would
result in unnecessary confusion, expense and delay. The Michigan federal judges
thought that provision that the court may at any time order election or separate
trial of counts or grant severance of defendants endangers the rule against double
jeopardy.2 Thomas J. Morrissey, United States Attorney for Colorado, objected
to allowing the court to order separate trials of counts or grant a severance of
defendants of its own motion. Clyde 0. Eastus, United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Texas, was opposed to Rule 14; he did not think that
severance should be granted by the federal courts. Joseph F. Deeb, United
1 COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 100 (1943).
2 Id. at 400 (1943). See Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 982 n. 460 (1959).
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States Attorney for the Western District of Michigan thought that there would
be no jeopardy if the order of the trial court were based on the motion of the
defendant at any stage in the proceeding. But if the order were made on the
motion of the government or on the court's own motion, after the jury had
been impaneled and sworn, there would be jeopardy. Hence the rule should be
restricted so far as it applies to motion by the government or the court's own
motion. Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge thought that the rule sug-
gested the question of whether severance after trial had started would prevent
retrial of the defendant severed on the ground of double jeopardy.'
Marks Alexander, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern Dis-
trict of Illinois, pointed out that, if the trial court severs a count or counts after
the trial has started and after a jury has been drawn, the court is in effect
directing a verdict of acquittal.' The court otherwise has the power to direct a
verdict, but may not so direct if there is substantial evidence indicating guilt.
If a defendant has been placed in jeopardy and the court of its own motion
may call for a severance, how does the court use the power under a rule of
sound judicial discretion? If two defendants are tried together and the court
severs during the trial, the government probably cannot then retry the defendant
who was severed from the case. Judge Pierson M. Hall of the Southern District
of California offered a motion at the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit
to eliminate the words "multiplicity of counts"; otherwise, he said, some might
argue that this was the only ground of relief from joinder of offenses.5 The
motion was seconded by Judge St. Sure and unanimously carried. George F.
Kneip of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice objected to the
language "provide whatever other relief justice may require." If it is intended
to authorize the court to dismiss the indictment, he said, the provision should
be eliminated. The other remedies, election, separate trial of counts, or severance
should be the only ones permitted. There are no circumstances under which
the court should have the power to dismiss an indictment merely because of
prejudicial joinder of offenses or defendants, or to dismiss any particular counts
if they, in fact, deal with definite offenses or defendants. James E. Ruffin of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice thought the rule materially de-
fective in not giving the court power to give relief in cases of probable prejudicial
duplicity.6 In the opinion of Drury W. Cooper of New York the words "may
order an election or separate trial of counts" did not seem wholly clear.
The second preliminary draft (eighth committee draft), dated February,
1944, changed the number of the rule to 13. It provided:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced
by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or infor-
mation or in a trial, whether by multiplicity of counts or of de-
fendants or otherwise, the court may order an election or separate
trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever
relief justice requires. A severance of defendants may be granted only
before trial.
3 Id. at 401.
4 Id. at 403.
5 Id. at 401.
6 Id. at 402.
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But there was no such time limit as to severance of offenses.
There was little comment to the Advisory Committee on this rule. Judge
David A. Pine of the District of Columbia suggested that, to avoid apparent
contradiction in the provisions of the rule and possible double jeopardy, the
words "in a trial" be deleted.7 He believed the words "a severance of defendants"
should be deleted from the last sentence, and the words "such relief" be inserted
in lieu thereof. He said there should be added to the last sentence the following
clause: "except that during a trial the Court may grant such relief on motion
of a defendant when it appears that he is prejudiced by such joinder and such
prejudice could not have been reasonably anticipated before trial." Double
jeopardy would not be involved where the motion was made by the defendant.
The special committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association would delete the
language "whether by multiplicity of counts or of defendants or otherwise."'
Such language if retained might tend to limit the power of the court to order the
relief therein provided, which should exist in any case where prejudice to the
defendant or the government is shown by the joinder. The committee would
eliminate the last sentence of the rule providing that a "severance of defendants
may be granted only before trial."
The report of the Advisory Committee (ninth committee draft) dated June,
1944, contained Rule 14 in the present form and sequence. In prior drafts the
rule had preceded instead of followed the rule on trial together of indictments
or informations. The Supreme Court adopted the rule as contained in the report
without any change.
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO RULE 14
A. Duplicity
1. Motion to quash
A writer on federal criminal procedure has concluded: "If duplicity exists
in an indictment, the indictment is bad and should be quashed upon motion or
declared bad upon demurrer."9
Duplicity may be attacked by a motion to quash. Such a motion was
granted where a single count charged a capital felony and a misdemeanor."
Subsequent cases support this view. 1 If the motion is made and denied, it will
not avail on writ of error unless the substantial rights of the defendant were
prejudiced. 2 A motion to quash is addressed to the discretion of the court "and
7 Id. Vol. 3 at 47a.
8 Id. Vol. 4 at 31.
9 Leavitt, Duplicity in Indictments Under Section 37, Criminal Code of the United
States, 6 ILL. L. REV. 135, 137 (1924). He cited as authority only United States v. Louisville &
N. R.R., 165 Fed. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky. 1908).
10 United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas. 1046 (No. 16265) (C.C.D. Pa. 1815).
11 Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895); Center v. United States, 96 F.2d
127, 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Egan v. United States, 287 Fed. 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1923);
Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1919); Knauer v. United States, 237 Fed.
8, 11, 13 (8th Cir. 1916) (demurrer also filed); Steigman v. United States, 220 Fed. 63, 67
(3d Cir. 1915); Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908); United States v.
Nunnemacher, 27 Fed. Cas. 202 (No. 15903) (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1876); United States v. Peterson,
27 Fed. Cas. 515, 519 (No. 16037) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846); United States v. Atlantic Commission
Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 193 (E.D.N.C. 1942); United States v. Main, 28 F. Supp. 550, 555
(S.D. Tex. 1939); United States v. Schmidt, 15 F. Supp. 804, 805 (M.D. Pa. 1936); United
States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 897 (E.D. Mich. 1918) (motion granted).
12 Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895).
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will not be reviewed by an appellate court save in cases where the failure to
properly exercise judicial discretion amounts to a denial of justice.""8 In 1931 a
court suggested that a demurrer be used instead of a motion to quash as the
motion to quash is discretionary and not subject to appeal. 4 In 1942 it was
suggested that neither a motion to quash or a demurrer should be used, but
rather a motion to elect. 5
2. Demurrer
In an early case, Chief Judge Cranch stated: "In civil actions advantage
can be taken of duplicity only by special demurrer; but in criminal cases it is
fatal on general demurrer."'0 Many subsequent cases have supported this view.'
Even if the defendant demurs and his demurrer is overruled, it will not avail on
writ of error unless the substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced.'
It has been asserted that duplicity may not be attacked by general de-
murrer.' Motion to elect should be used, instead.2" But another court has stated
13 Steigman v. United States, 220 Fed. 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1915).
14 Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931).
15 United States v. Charney, 50 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Mass. 1942).
16 United States v. Watkins, 28 Fed. Cas. 419, 430 (No. 16649) (C.C.D.C. 1829). The
court cited in support a case granting a motion to quash. United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas.
1046 (No. 16265) (C.C.D. Pa. 1815). In Lewellen v. United States, 223 Fed. 18, 20 (8th
Gir. 1915), the court required a special demurrer.
17 The demurrer was sustained in the following cases: Bailey v. United States, 53 F.2d 982
(5th Cir. 1931); Curtis v. United States, 38 F.2d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 1930); Creel v. United
States, 21 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1927), noted 37 YALE L. J. 522 (1928); John Gund Brewing Co.
v. United States, 204 Fed. 17, 21 (8th Cir. 1913); United States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp.
177, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1939); United States v. Cleveland, 281 Fed. 249, 250 (S.D. Ala. 1922);
United States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 897 (E.D. Mich. 1918); United States v. Blakeman,
251 Fed. 306, 308 (N.D.N.Y. 1918); United States v. American Naval Stores Co., 186 Fed.
592, 596 (S.D. Ga. 1909) ;United States v. Smith, 152 Fed. 542, 545 (W.D. Ky. 1907) ; United
States v. Cadwallader, 59 Fed. 677 (W.D. Wis. 1893). The demurrer was overruled in the
following cases: United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943), reversing 123 F.2d 111,
121 (7th Cir. 1941); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919); Anderson v.
United States, 170 U.S. 481, 492 (1898); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895);
Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931); Collins v. United States, 20 F.2d
574, 576 (8th Cir. 1927); Lau v. United States, 13 F.2d 975, 976 (8th Gir. 1926); Evans v.
United States, 11 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1926); United States v. Olmstead, 5 F.2d 712, 715
(W.D. Wash. 1925); Bailey v. United States, 5 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 1925); Boone v.
United States, 257 Fed. 963, 964 (8th Cir. 1919); Bailey v. United States, 278 Fed. 849, 853
(6th Gir. 1922); Anderson v. United States, 273 Fed. 20, 22, 28 (8th Cir. 1921); Wells v.
United States, 257 Fed. 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1919); Knauer v. United States, 237 Fed. 8, 11,
13 (8th Cir. 1916); Lewellen y. United States, 223 Fed. 18, 20 (8th Gir. 1915); Ammerman v.
United States, 216 Fed. 326, 329 (8th Gir. 1914); Norton v. United States, 205 Fed. 593
(8th Cir. 1913) cert. denied, 235 U.S. 699 (1914); May v. United States, 199 Fed. 53, 60
(8th Cir. 1912); Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908); Gourdain v.
United States, 154 Fed. 453, 459 (7th Cir. 1907); United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47
F. Supp. 524, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Drawdy v. United States, 288 Fed. 567, 570 (S.D. Fla.
1923); United States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664, 673 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v.
Eccles, 181 Fed. 906, 908 (D. Ore. 1910); United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 157 Fed.
288, 290 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907); United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823,
831 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906); United States v. Scott, 74 Fed. 213, 215 (C.C.D. Ky. 1895);
United States v. Thomas, 69 Fed. 588 (S.D. Cal. 1895); United States v. Byrne, 44 Fed. 188
(E.D. Mo. 1890); United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 519 (No. 16037) (C.C.D. Mass.
1846).
18 Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895).
19 Chambliss v. United States, 218 Fed. 154, 156 (8th Cir. 1914); Pooler v. United States,
127 Fed. 509, 515 (1st Cir. 1904); United States v. Luther, 260 Fed. 579, 584 (E.D. Okla.
1919).
20 United States v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 165 Fed. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky. 1908). The
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that a count may be held bad for duplicity "if reasonably challenged on that
ground, either by a motion to quash, demurrer, or motion to elect, which are
the three approved methods for doing it."'" In some cases both a demurrer and
a motion to quash have been filed.22 One case asserted that demurrer and not
motion to quash should be used to attack duplicity.2"
3. Motion to elect
Duplicity may be attacked by a motion to compel the government to elect.24
One case denied the possibility of election and nolle prosequi on the theory that
this would permit the government to amend the grand jury indictment, but
upheld a demurrer and a motion to quash.25
4. Objection to admission of evidence
Duplicity has been attacked by objection to the admission of evidence for
the government." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated broadly
that motion to exclude any evidence "is not recognized in the federal courts, at
least in this circuit. '27
5. Motion for directed verdict
Rarely duplicity has been attacked by a motion for directed verdict.2" The
court assumed, without deciding, that this method of attack could be used and
found no duplicity.
6. Motion in arrest of judgment
Duplicity is said to be waived by going to trial; 9 for that reason motion in
arrest of judgment does not lie," although a few cases imply the contrary."
court pointed out that the rule against duplicity had not "received much favor, if any, in the
Supreme Court." See also United States v. Charney, 50 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Mass. 1942).
21 Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908). See also Wells v. United
States, 257 Fed. 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1919).
22 Knauer v. United States, 237 Fed. 8, 11, 13 (8th Cir. 1916); United States v. Glasser,
116 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1940); United States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 895 (E.D.
Mich. 1918).
23 Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931). But the court treated a
motion to quash as a demurrer.
24 Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 648 (1896); Crain v. United States, 162 U.S.
625, 635 (1896); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895); In re Lane, 135 U.S.
443, 448 (1890); Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir. 1937); Sunderland v.
United States, 19 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir. 1927); Robinson v. United States, 288 Fed. 450,
451 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ; Bailey v. United States, 278 Fed. 849, 850, 853 (6th Cir. 1922) ; Wells
v. United States, 257 Fed. 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1919); Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953,
958 (8th Cir. 1908); United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 165 Fed. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky.
1908); United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 518 (No. 16037) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
25 United States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1918).
26 Wright v. United States, 227 Fed. 855, 856 (8th Cir. 1915). The lower court overruled
the objection. The court of appeals reversed for insufficiency of evidence.
27 Sunderland v. United States, 19 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir. 1927). See also Boone v.
United States, 257 Fed. 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1919).
28 Sunderland v. United States, 19 F.2d 202, 205, 206 (8th Cir. 1927).
29 Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1946); Barnard v. United
States, 16 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1926); Matthews v. United States, 300 Fed. 556 (7th Cir.
1924); Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1919); Lemon v. United States,
164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908).
30 Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 635 (1896); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S.
408, 411 (1895); Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 315 (1894); Sunderland v. United
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There is a doctrine of cure by verdict:" A defendant who pleads guilty cannot
later raise the issue of duplicity, as he is in the same position as if he had been
found guilty by the verdict of a jury.s" When the sentence is less than that au-
thorized under a good count, the conviction will not be reversed because of a
duplicitous count."
7. Appeal
Duplicity may not be attacked for the first time on writ of error or appeal. 3
Even if the issue was raised below, as by demurrer or motion to quash, there
would be no reversal unless injury to substantial rights of the defendant were
shown, in view of the statute on imperfections of form." The same is true as to
repugnancy within a count, as charging offenses which are repugnant to each
other.3 7 Occasionally the appellate courts review the issue of duplicity even
though it was not clearly raised below, and find that it did not exist.33 One case
asserted that, where duplicity was raised by motion to quash, a denial of the
motion is not subject to review, but nevertheless reversed and found no duplic-
ity." Another court held that it would not review the objection of duplicity
where the appellant did not show that his substantial rights were prejudiced, no
motion to elect was made, and the charge of the court, if any, was not preserved."0
8. Habeas corpus
Duplicity may not be attacked following conviction on a writ of habeas
corpus,4 ' because the accused should have moved to compel the government to
elect.
States, 19 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir. 1927); Barnard v. United States, 16 F.2d 451, 453 (9th
Cir. 1926); Chew v. United States, 9 F.2d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 1925); Poller v. United States,
127 Fed. 509, 515 (lst Cir. 1904); Lehman v. United States, 127 Fed. 41, 46 (2nd Cir. 1903).
31 Motion in arrest was denied on the facts without any intimation that it never would lie
in United States v. Golding, 25 Fed. Cas. 1349 (No. 15224) (G.C.D.C. 1820) ; United States v.
Fero, 18 Fed. 901 (E.D. Wis. 1883). In Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 648 (1896),
the court pointed out that the defendant's counsel "did not seek to compel an election, nor
in any manner, by their motion in arrest or otherwise, to raise the question of duplicity." In
United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 519 (No. 16037) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846), the court
held that motion in arrest is not a ground for relief where the offenses belong to the same class
or family of crimes.
32 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896); Greater New York Live Poultry
Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 47 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1931).
33 Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928).
34 Evans v. United States, 11 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1926).
35 Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895); Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S.
308, 315 (1894); Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928); Lewellen v.
United States, 223 Fed. 18, 20 (8th Cir. 1915); Chambliss v. United States, 218 Fed. 154, 156
(8th Cir. 1914); Lehman v. United States, 127 Fed. 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1903). But in Andersen v.
United States, 170 U.S. 481, 493 (1898), the Supreme Court considered the point even though
it pointed out that it should have been raised below by demurrer.
36 Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411 (1895); Bailey v. United States, 278 Fed.
849, 853 (6th Cir. 1922).
37 Lehman v. United States, 127 Fed. 41, 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1903) (very full discussion);
Sims v. United States, 121 Fed. 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1903).
38 Magon v. United States, 260 Fed. 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1919).
39 Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1931).
40 Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir. 1937). This approach is approved in
37 YALE L. J. 522 (1928).
41 In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 448 (1890). Common law rape and statutory rape were
charged.
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B. Misjoinde? of Offenses
1. Motion to quash
Misjoinder of offenses has been attacked by a motion to quash the in-
dictment,42 but the motion to quash will not lie if the offenses joined are of the
same class,4 if the offenses joined arise out of the same transaction," or if the
transactions are connected together.45 Misjoinder may be cured by a nolle
prosequi.4 ' A motion to quash is not the proper remedy where an unduly large
number of counts is set out; motion to elect is the most relief the defendant may
have.4' A motion to quash should be granted where the parties are not the
same and where the offenses are not parts of the same transaction.4' A motion
to quash has been granted where an indictment sets out more offenses than
permitted under a special statute on using the mails to defraud." A motion to
quash does not lie because several counts charge the same offense in different
ways; motion to elect is the proper remedy.5" Nor will it lie when an indictment
charges a corporate defendant with a misdemeanor and an individual defendant
with a felony; the individual defendant can move for a severance and thus
secure his full number of peremptory challenges.5
In one case a motion to quash has been held proper, even though the of-
fenses were of the same class. An indictment containing two counts charged the
defendant with carnal knowledge of different females, the offense charged in
the first count being alleged to have been committed more than six months
before that alleged in the second count. 2 In another case the defendant moved
42 United States v. Porter, 27 Fed. Cas. 595, 596 (No. 16072) (C.C.D.C. 1812), five counts
were involved. Two counts were quashed. There was a nolle prosequi as to two counts and the
defendant was convicted on one count. Other grounds of error were involved, so that the relief
seems not necessarily to have been given for misjoinder. A motion to quash was made in
United States v. Scott, 27 Fed. Cas. 997 (No. 16241) (D. Ind. 1865), but denied because a
nolle prosequi was filed. Otherwise it would have been granted as the offenses did not come
within the cases of joinder permitted by the joinder statute. A motion to quash was granted in
United States v. Gaston, 28 Fed. 848 (N.D. Ohio, 1886), the penalty being different for the
offenses joined, and the offenses not involving the same transaction nor being of the same class.
43 Armstrong v. United States, 16 F.2d 62, 64 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 766
(1927); Morris v. United States 12 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1926); Grock v. United States,
289 Fed. 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1923); McNeil v. United States, 246 Fed. 827, 828 (5th Cir.
1917); United States v. Cardish, 145 Fed. 242, 243 (E.D. Wis. 1906); United States v. Went-
worth, 11 Fed. 52, 53 (C.C.D.N.H. 1882); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1107, 1109
(No. 14572) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); United States v. O'Callahan, 27 Fed. Cas. 216, (No.
15910) (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1855).
44 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 403 (1894); Harris v. United States, 8 F.2d
841, 842 (5th Cir. 1925); Goodfriend v. United States, 294 Fed. 148, 150 (9th Cir. 1923);
Welsh v. United States, 267 Fed. 819, 821 (2d Cir. 1920); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed.
Gas. 1107, 1109 (No. 14572) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); United States v. Jacoby, 26 Fed. Cas.
570, 571 (No. 15462) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); United States v. Belvin, 46 Fed. 381, 385 (E.D.
Va. 1891).
45 Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1938); Powers v. United States,
293 Fed. 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1923); United States v. Barber, 289 Fed. 523 (S.D. Fla. 1923);
McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1903); United States v. Jones, 69
Fed. 973, 980 (D. Nev. 1895); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1107, 1109 (No.
14572) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
46 United States v. Nye, 4 Fed. 888, 890 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1880).
47 United States v. Harman, 38 Fed. 827, 829 (D. Kan. 1889).
48 McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76 (1896).
49 United States v. Clark, 125 Fed. 92, 93 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
50 Wetzel v. United States, 233 Fed. 984, 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 648
(1916). See also United States v. Alluan, 13 F. Supp. 289, 291 (N.D. Tex. 1936).
51 United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 43 F.2d 135, 144 (M.D. Pa. 1930).
52 Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566,.570 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
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to quash, and in the alternative for an election between counts." In another
case the defendant moved to quash, demurred, and moved for an election;"'
in a third the defendant moved to quash and for an election.55 One court has
quoted Chitty" as saying that misjoinder of offenses of the same nature may
be attacked by motion to quash the indictment before plea or to compel the
government to elect, but not by demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment. 7
What is the scope of the motion to quash? Most of the cases do not say.
One court has said that the motion challenged the indictment as a whole, rather
than one or more counts in it;" but another court stated: "Misjoinder does not
render an indictment incapable of supporting a verdict. If the defendant is
embarrassed by such a fault in the indictment against him, he should in advance
of trial move to quash it, or for a severance, or to compel the prosecutor to
elect on which counts he shall be put to trial."" In another case, where the
defendant moved to quash, the court stated: "Where any single count of an
indictment against several persons is sufficient in form and substance to charge
a public offense, the fact that there has been a misjoinder of either offenses or
persons charged therein will not invalidate the indictment as a whole."6"
2. Demurrer
Misjoinder of offenses has been attacked by demurrer;6' but demurrer will
not lie if the offenses joined are of the same class,62 or involve the same trans-
action, 3 or are connected together.64 One decision has asserted that demurrer
is not a proper mode of attack, but rather motion to quash or motion to elect, 65
and subsequent decisions hold that a motion to elect is proper66 Where there
. 53 Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1923). See also United States v.
General Electric Co., 40 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
54 Kelleher v. United States, 35 F.2d 877, 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
55 Dean v. United States, 51 F.2d 481, 482 (9th Cir. 1931).
56 1 CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAw, §§ 249, 253 (1819).
57 United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1931).
58 Harris v. United States, 8 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1925).
59 Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931).
60 Culjak v. United States, 53 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1931).
61 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 403 (1894); United States v. Stilson, 254 Fed.
120, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1918); United States v. Van Leuven, 62 Fed. 62, 68 (N.D. Iowa 1894);
United States v. Lehman, 39 Fed. 768, 773 (E.D. Mo. 1889); United States v. Spintz, 18 Fed.
377 (S.D. Ga. 1883); United States v. Nye, 4 Fed. 888, 897 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1880).
62 United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1941); Kelleher v. United
States, 35 F.2d 877, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1929); United States v. Jacopetti, 17 F.2d 771, 772
(N.D. Cal. 1927); Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1926); United States
v. Olmstead, 5 F.2d 712, 715 (W.D. Wash. 1925); Anderson v. United States, 273 Fed. 20,
22, 28 (8th Cir. 1921); Hyde v. United States, 27 App. D.C. 362 (D.C. Cir. 1906); Ben-
son v. United States, 27 App. D.C. 331, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1906); Dillard v. United States,
141 Fed. 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1905); United States v. Ridgway, 199 Fed. 286, 289 (W.D.
Wash. 1912); United States v. Berry, 96 Fed. 842, 844 (W.D. Va. 1899); United States v.
Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885, 886, 895 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1890); United States v. O'Callahan, 27
Fed. Cas. 216 (No. 15910) (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1855).
63 DUllard v. United States, 141 Fed. 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1905); United States v. Barber,
289 Fed. 523, 524 (S.D. Fla. 1923); United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885, 894 (G.C.W.D.
Ga. 1890); United States v. Traveller, 7 Alaska 23, 24 (D. Alaska 1923).
64 Kreuzer v. United States, 254 Fed. 34, 37 (8th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 603
(1919); United States v. Davidson, 244 Fed. 523, 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1917).
65 United States v. Wentworth, 11 Fed. 52, 53 (C.C.D.N.H. 1882).
66 Todd v. United States, 48 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1931); Optner v. United States,
13 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1926) (or nolle prosequi); United States v. Cardish, 145 Fed. 242,
244 (E.D. Wis. 1906); United States v. Eastman, 132 Fed. 551, 555 (C.C.D.N.H. 1904).
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is a joinder of several counts setting forth the same crime in different ways, to
avoid a variance, demurrer does not lie."
Where a special statute as to mail frauds limits the number of offenses
which may be charged, the remedy of the defendant is not by demurrer, but
by motion to compel the government to elect on which counts it will proceed
after the evidence is in, if the counts are merely varied descriptions of the same
offense; or by compelling the government before trial to nolle prosse so as to
reduce the number of offenses to the limit allowed by the statute.6 The alleging
of more than the statutory number of offenses does not make the whole indict-
ment bad.
What is the scope of the demurrer for misjoinder? Most cases do not say.
In one case the court held that it challenged the indictment as a whole, and
not one or more counts in it.69
3. Plea in abatement
Occasionally misjoinder of offenses has been attacked by a plea in abate-
ment.7" The plea will not be sustained where several counts are used to state
the same offense in different ways to avoid variance at the trial. Nor will it be
sustained where the counts are for the same transaction, or involve acts and
transactions connected together."
4. Motion to strike
In one case alleged misjoinder was attacked by a motion to strike.72
5. Motion to compel election
Where an indictment contains several counts charging offenses against
the internal revenue laws, which are misdemeanors, the court will not compel
the government to elect between the several counts. "On this point it is only
necessary to say, that an examination of the textbooks will show it to be well
settled that, in cases of misdemeanor, several offenses may be joined in different
counts, and that there is no right, in such cases, to compel the prosecutor to
rely on one transaction."7 In a subsequent case involving felonies the court
stated: "Whether the joinder was calculated to embarrass the prisoner, and,
therefore, the offenses not 'properly joined,' within the meaning of the statute,
was a question to be determined by the judge in his discretion, on a motion to
quash or to compel an election."7 4 In a case in which it was held that the
government need not have elected between six counts describing a murder in
67 Todd v. United States, 48 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1931); Sneierson v. United States,
264 Fed. 268, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 490 (1920); United. States v. Central
Vermont Ry., 157 Fed. 291, 293 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907); Etheredge v. United States, 186
Fed. 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1911).
68 Etheredge v. United States, 186 Fed. 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1911).
69 Harris v. United States, 8 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1925).
70 United States v. Howell, 65 Fed. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1895).
71 United States v. Jones, 69 Fed. 973, 980 (D. Nev. 1895). In this case a motion to
quash on the same ground was also filed.
72 United States v. Barber, 289 Fed. 523 (S.D. Fla. 1923).
73 United States v. Devlin, 25 Fed. Cas. 840, 841 (No. 14953) (C0.(C.E.D.N.Y. 1868).
Accord: Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 395, 402 (1894); Hartman v. United States,
168 Fed. 30, 31 (6th Cir. 1909); Morris v. United States, 161 Fed. 672, 674 (8th Cir. 1908);
United States v. Mullen, 7 F.2d 244 (E.D. La. 1925).
74 United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Gas. 1107, 1109 (No. 14572) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
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different ways as to the means used, the court stated broadly: "Where an
indictment contains several counts, the prosecution will not be compelled to
elect on which count they will ask conviction."75 Where a very long and un-
necessary number of counts is set out in the indictment, the most relief a
defendant may obtain is compelling the government to elect on which counts
it will prosecute; a motion to quash is improper." On the other hand, it has
been pointed out that "it would manifestly be far more oppressive to the offender
to torture him with 32 consecutive trials on 32 separate indictments than to
combine them as the statute permits and subject him only to one trial."' 7
Where offenses are properly joined in an indictment the defendant cannot
compel the government to elect.78 No election is required where the indictment
charges in several counts offenses of the same class and connected with the same
transaction.79 The Supreme Court has stated broadly: "The question of election
The court cited Commonwealth v. Birdsall, 69 Pa. St. 482, 484 (1871). See also Dillard
v. United States, 141 Fed. 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1905); Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed.
225, 237 (6th Cir. 1905); United States v. Wentworth, 11 Fed. 52, 53 (C.C.D.N.H. 1882);
United States v. Stone, 8 Fed. 232, 237 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881); United States v. Nye, 4
Fed. 888, 892 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1880).
75 United States v. Neverson, 12 D.C. 152, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1880). The Supreme Court
has held in a case where there were two counts charging the same murder in a different man-
ner that whether the government must elect is "a matter purely within the discretion of the
court." Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355, 356 (1895). See also Clifton v. United States,
295 Fed. 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Foster v. United States, 256 Fed. 207, (5th Cir. 1919);
Terry v. United States, 120 Fed. 483, 484 (4th Cir. 1903); United States v. General Electric
Co., 40 F. Supp. 627, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Compare Thomas v. Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 976,
978 (10th Cir. 1942); Cain v. United States, 19 F.2d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 1927); Koth v.
United States, 16 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1926).
76 Morris v. United States, 161 Fed. 672, 674 (8th Cir. 1908); Hyde v. United States,
27 App. D.C. 362, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1906); United States v. Harmon, 38 Fed. 827, 829 (D.
Kan. 1889).
77 Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1898). The court cited many
federal cases involving numerous counts. The Supreme Court saw no objection to an indict-
ment containing 119 counts, United States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655, 656 (1882); nor to one
containing 59 counts, United States v. Northway, 120 U.S. 327, 328 (1887); nor to one con-
taining 50 counts, Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895); nor to 17 counts sub-
mitted to the jury at a second trial, Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664, 665 (1896). A
lower court saw no objection to 57 counts, United States v. Harper, 33 Fed. 471, 472, 494
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1887). In one case the government was required to elect 25 out of 70
counts, United States v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 42 F. Supp. 64 (M.D. Tenn. 1941).
In another case the government was required to elect 25 out of 60 counts, United States v.
Hoover Truck Co., 42 F. Supp. 65 (M.D. Tenn. 1941).
78 United States v. Prior, 27 Fed. Cas. 624 (No. 16092) (C.C.D.C. 1837).
79 Dobbins v. United States, 157 F.2d 257, 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 734
(1946); United States v. Hunt, 120 F.2d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v. Sullivan,
98 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1938); Tinkoff v. United States, 85 F.2d 868, 876 (7th Cir.), cert.
denie.d, 301 U.S. 689 (1936); McNeil v. United States, 85 F.2d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1936);
Felio v. United States, 55 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1932); Kelleher v. United States, 35 F.2d
877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Litkovsky v. United States, 9 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1925);
Arnold v. United States, 7 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1925); Lewis v. United States, 4 F.2d
520, 522 (5th Cir. 1925); Egan v. United States, 5 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Goodfriend
v. United States, 294 Fed. 148, 150 (9th Cir. 1923); Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964,
967 (9th Cir. 1923); Robinson v. United States, 288 Fed. 450, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Egan
v. United States, 287 Fed. 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Caudle v. United States, 278 Fed.
710, 712 (8th Cir. 1921); Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86, 89 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 257 U.S. 656 (1921); Fowler v. United States, 273 Fed. 15, 17 (9th Cir. 1921)
(three conspiracies to violate three related statutes charged); McNeil v. United States, 246
Fed. 827, 828 (5th Cir. 1917); Rooney v. United States, 203 Fed. 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1913);
Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. 225, 237 (6th Cir. 1905); McGregor v. United States,
134 Fed. 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1904); United States v. Barber, 289 Fed. 523 (S.D. Fla. 1923);
United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 520 (No. 16037) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846); United
States v. Dickenson, 25 Fed. Cas. 850, 851 (No. 14958) (C.C.D. Ohio, 1840).
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between distinct charges has always seemed to depend on the special circum-
stances of the case in which it has arisen. '"" The court could quash an indictment
or compel an election when the parties are not the same in each count and where
the offenses are not parts of the same transaction."'
Although election of counts is seldom ordered, the statute on joinder seems
to confer considerable discretion on the trial court. The statute permits joinder
only of offenses which "may properly be joined." Thus, it does not necessarily
follow that joinder is proper merely because the offenses are of the same class,
or arise out of the same transaction, or are connected together. The "settled
principles of criminal law" must be looked at in determining what offenses "may
properly be joined." 2 It is a matter of discretion whether election will be com-
pelled. If in the opinion of the trial court the jury will not be confused by the
multiplicity of charges and the defendant will not be embarrassed in his defense,
the court may refuse to direct the government to elect.
Occasionally election may be required even where the offenses joined are
of the same class. It was so held where an indictment containing two counts
charged the defendant with carnal knowledge of two different females, more
than six months intervening between the offenses. The court stated:
It is doubtful whether separate and distinct felonies, involving
different parties, not arising out of the same transaction or dependent
upon the same proof, should ever be consolidated. But it should not
be permitted, where the crimes charged are of such a nature that
the jury might regard one as corroborative of the other, when in
fact, no corroboration exists.8 3
The court was "of opinion that for the failure of the court to quash the indict-
ment, or to compel the government to elect upon which count it would proceed,
a new trial would be granted."8 4 But where a defendant motorist fatally injured
two persons within a few minutes on the same automobile ride, the trial court
was affirmed in denying the motion of the defendant for a severance of the two
counts and for an election upon which count the defendant would be first
separately tried. The court stated: "Here the record showed that the killings
were closely connected in time, place, and continuity. They occurred within a
few minutes of each other and on the same automobile ride and by means of
the same instrument." 5 Where two defendants were indicted and convicted of
first degree murder, the government was not required to elect between the first
three counts charging deliberate and premeditated malice and the second three
charging that the defendant purposely killed the deceased while perpetrating an
offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary." There was evidence
which would justify a conviction as to the first three counts and even more clearly
80 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 402 (1894). Accord: Lorenz v. United
States, 24 App. D.C. 337, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1904).
81 McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 81 (1896).
82 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 400 (1894); United States v. Perlstein, 120
F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1941). In the latter case the court quoted 1 CHITrY, CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 249, 253 (1819). See also United States v. Brenner, 55 F. Supp. 918, 919 (D. Del. 1944).
83 Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
84 Id. at 571.
85 Nestlerode v. United States, 122 F.2d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
86 Goodman v. United States, 70 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
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as to the second three. A general verdict and judgment of conviction would
stand if any count was valid.
Occasionally it has been intimated that a motion to elect is available even
though the courts involve offenses arising out of the same transaction. 7
Occasional cases hold that where several counts are used to state the same
offense in different ways, a motion to elect is proper.8 But error in failing to
compel election may be cured where the sentence is on only one count and does
not exceed that which is permissible on conviction of a single offense. 9
A motion to elect between counts will not lie where the indictments contain
no such counts.9
A motion to elect on the ground of repugnancy of counts has been denied
where the court concluded that there was no repugnancy.9' When two counts
are contradictory, the defendant may move for an election; he cannot remain
passive or rely only on motion in arrest of judgment.92 If he fails to move for
an election, a verdict of guilty on both counts and judgment thereon will stand.
The problem of election has arisen in a peculiar form as to the crime of
conspiracy. In a leading case several defendants were indicted on seven counts,
each charging a conspiracy to violate a separate and distinct internal revenue
law. At the close of the trial the defendants contended that the proof did not
establish more than one agreement and moved that the court require the
government to elect one of the seven counts on which to proceed. The trial
court refused and the defendants were convicted and sentenced for several
conspiracies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a single agreement to
commit acts in violation of several federal statutes is not punishable as several
conspiracies.9" The government may not split up a single agreement into a
plurality of offenses by charging in different counts the violation of different
statutory provisions as objects of the conspiracy.
In one case the defendant made his motion that the government elect after
his plea of not guilty, and before the jury were called. 4 According to the Supreme
Court the election could be made even later. Justice Harlan stated:
It is appropriate to say that we lay no stress upon the circum-
stance that the motions in question were not made until after the
87 Phillips v. United States, 264 Fed. 657, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 491
(1920); United States v. Brenner, 55 F. Supp. 918 (D. Del. 1944).
88 Thomas v. Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1942); Porter v. United States,
31 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1929); Cain v. United States, 19 F.2d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 1927);
Koth v. United States, 16 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1926); Lewis v. United States, 4 F.2d 520,
522 (5th Cir. 1925); Wetzel v. United States, 233 Fed. 984, 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 242
U.S. 648 (1916).
89 Wetzel v. United States, 233 Fed. 984, 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 648
(1916).
90 Lonergan v. United States, 88 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 663
(1937).
91 Botsford v. United States, 215 Fed. 510, 511, 514 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S.
763 (1914).
92 Moore v. United States, 288 Fed. 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
93 Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 51 (1942), noted 27 MINN. L. Rv. 405
(1943); 91 U. PA. L. REv. 475 (1943).
94 United States v. Dickinson, 25 Fed. Cas. 850 (No. 14959) (C.C.D. Ohio, 1840). In
Morris v. United States, 161 Fed. 672, 674 (8th Cir. 1908), the motion was made at the
opening of the trial. In Fowler v. United States, 273 Fed. 15, 17 (9th Cir. 1921), motions
to elect were made first after part of the government's testimony and then at the end of the
government's testimony.
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defendant had pleaded not guilty. We have already said that, if
in the progress of the trial it appeared that the accused might be
embarrassed or confounded in his defense, by reason of being com-
pelled to meet both charges of murder at the same time, and before
the same jury, it was in the power of the court, at any time before
the trial was concluded, to require the government to elect upon
which change it would seek a verdict.95
Before the trial, the court may refuse to compel an election because the facts
have not been disclosed. 6 In another case the court held that "the trial court
has discretion to require the government, either before it has offered proof, or
after it has closed its proof, to elect certain counts on which it will ask con-
viction." 9' In another case the court stated that
whenever it shall be made to appear, whether before the trial, at
its inception or during the process of the trial, that the respondent
would be unreasonably embarrassed by a trial together of the alleged
offenses against the different banking associations, the government
will be compelled to elect whether it will go to trial, or proceed
with the trial, as the case may be, upon the counts relating to the
Berlin Bank, or those relating to the Gorham Bank.98
A defendant could not complain on appeal that the government was not re-
quired to elect at the close of the government's evidence,99 when it was required
to elect at the close of all the evidence. The criminal defendant was not preju-
diced by the delay, while the government might have been if it had been
required to elect earlier. One court stated broadly: "It is generally discretion-
ary with the trial court at which state of the trial an election will be com-
pelled. 100
Error in refusing a motion to elect may be cured when the defendant is
acquitted on a count; 0 1 or when the sentence is only one count;. 2 or where
the same sentence is imposed on both counts and they are made to run con-
currently. 0
6. Severance of counts and separate trials
The trial court may apparently on its own motion sever the counts at the
opening of the trial.'" As severance of counts is addressed to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court, the appellate court will not review a denial of a sev-
95 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 404 (1894).
96 Clifton v. United States, 295 Fed. 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United States v. Jones,
69 Fed. 973, 980 (D. Nev. 1895).
97 Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1898). In Rooney v. United
States, 203 Fed. 928, 929 (9th Cir. 1913), the motion was made at the close of the testimony.
98 United States v. Eastman, 132 Fed. 551, 555 (C.C.D.N.H. 1904).
99 Moffatt v. United States, 46 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1931). Nor can a defendant com-
plain of a refusal to compel election, when there is an election at the end of the government's
case. Dobbins v. United States, 157 F.2d 257, 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 734
(1946).
100 Bedell v. United States, 78 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 628
(1935).
101 Sidebotham v. United States, 253 Fed. 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1918).
102 Wetzel v. United States, 233 Fed. 984, 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 648
(1916).
103 Felio v. United States, 55 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1932); Mills v. United States, 294
Fed. 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1923).
104 Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1926).
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erance where no claim of injury from the joinder was made and none of the
evidence was brought up." 5
The trial court may order separate trials as to separate counts. In one
case the court stated: "It is unquestionably within the power of the court to
compel the government to elect upon which class of counts it will go to trial,
and dismiss the others, or to direct separate trials upon the different classes
of offenses." "'
7. Motion for directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v.
Occasionally a defendant moves for a directed verdict because of misjoinder
of offenses.'07 In one case the defendant moved for a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict because of misjoinder of offenses.'08
8. Motion for mistrial
In some cases joint trial of several offenses may be ground for mistrial
even though the trial court rejected the defendant's motion for a severance. In
a trial of two attorneys and others under indictment in two counts for con-
spiracy to obstruct the administration of justice and to operate an unregistered
still, where there was no evidence connecting one attorney with the conspiracy
to operate the still, the trial court erred in denying the attorney's motion for
mistrial on the ground that trial on both counts prejudiced his rights.' It made
no difference that the court directed a verdict for the defendant on the second
count.
9. Time of attack on misjoinder
It is sometimes intimated broadly that attacks on joinder should be made
before trial, or at least not after conviction. One court stated with respect to
both joinder of offenses and joinder of defendants: "If the defendant is em-
barrassed by such a fault in the indictment against him, he should in advance
of trial move to quash it, or for a severance, or to compel the prosecutor to
elect on which counts he shall be put to trial. He cannot take the chance of
acquittal on a trial and object to misjoinder only after conviction."" 0
10. Cure by verdict
There may be cure by verdict of a misjoined count. There is such cure
if the defendant is acquitted on the misjoined count,"" or if the misjoined count
105 Morris v. United States, 128 F.2d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 1942).
106 United States v. Eastman, 132 Fed. 551, 555 (C.C.D.N.H. 1904). See also Dowling
v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931).
107 United States v. Tuffanelli, 131 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1942); Stokes v. United States,
93 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 558 (1938).
108 Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1923).
109 United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1941). One judge dissented.
110 Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931). In United States v.
Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 622 (1939), the court merely
assumed this view to be correct without committing itself.
111 Culjak v. United States, 53 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1931); Weinhandler v. United
States, 20 F.2d 359, 362 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927); Optner v. United
States, 13 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1926); Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727, 728 (9th
Cir. 1926); Beaux Arts Dresser v. United States, 9 F.2d 531, 533 (2d Cir. 1925). The
question was left open in Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931).
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is withdrawn from consideration by the jury.1 12
11. Motion for new trial
A new trial may be granted where the defendant was prejudiced by the
joinder of offenses. In one case the court, though denying a new trial on the
facts of the particular case, stated broadly: "It is admitted that it is the duty
of the court to protect the prisoner from being prejudiced in his defense by
the joinder of offenses, and if satisfied that the defendant was so prejudiced,
a new trial would be granted." 3 A motion for new trial will not be granted
when an indictment contains several counts alleging the same offense in a
different way in order to prevent a variance, as such procedure is proper."4 In
many cases new trial is denied because the joinder is proper and the defendant
fails to prove prejudice."'
12. Motion in arrest of judgment
On motion in arrest of judgment the court will not arrest "unless the
offenses are of a nature and character radically different, as well as requiring
different judgments, different in kind and not merely indictments differing in
amount or degree." 6 Thus, there will be no arrest of judgment if the offenses
were committed at the same time and place, but were different in degree, one
for revolt and another for attempt to incite the revolt." 7 The technical rules
in civil cases do not apply in criminal cases, as the judgments in civil cases may
differ sharply from each other. In cases where an election might be required
before verdict, it does not follow that objection can be taken on motion in
arrest of judgment that no election was required.
When an indictment describes in different counts different offenses, and
of different grades and punishments, implied, however, from the same trans-
action, and the verdict is guilty of the last count only, motion in arrest will
not lie."' Motion in arrest does not lie where several counts are used to state
the same offense in different ways."' Motion in arrest has been denied follow-
112 Dean v. United States, 51 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1931); Latses v. United States,
45 F.2d 949, 950 (10th Cir. 1930).
113 United States v. Brent, 24 Fed. Cas. 1225, 1226 (No. 14640) (D. Nev. 1873). The
court found that the defendant was really benefited by the single trial of several offenses.
See also Ex parte Joyce, 13 Fed. Cas. 117 (No. 7556) (W.D. Mo. 1877).
114 Huffman v. United States, 259 Fed. 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1919); Orth v. United States,
252 Fed. 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1918); United States v. Burroughs, 25 Fed. Gas. 207, 209 (No.
14695) (C.C.D. Ohio, 1844); United States v. Keen, 26 Fed Gas. 686, 692 (No. 15510)
(C.C.D. Ind. 1839).
115 Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1923); United States v. Went-
worth, 11 Fed. 52, 54 (C.C.D.N.H. 1882); United States v. Stone, 8 Fed. 232, 251 (C.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1881).
116 United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 519 (No. 16027) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 403 (1894); United States v. Wentvorth, 11
Fed. 52, 53 (C.C.D.N.H. 1882); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1107, 1109 (No.
14572) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); United States v. Bums, 24 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1316 (No. 14691)
(C.C.D.C. 1849); United States v. McFarlane, 26 Fed. Cas. 1088 (No. 15675) (C.C.D.C.
1804).
117 United States v. Peterson, 27 Fed. Cas. 515, 519 (No. 16027) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
118 United States v. Stetson, 27 Fed. Cas. 1311 (No. 16390) (C.C.D. Mass. 1847).
119 Huffman v. United States, 259 Fed. 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1919); Orth v. United States,
25 Fed. 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1918).
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ing a denial of a motion to quash when the joinder was proper,2 ° as well as
after denial of a motion for directed verdict when the joinder was proper. 2' A
defendant who has pleaded guilty cannot move in arrest of judgment for mis-
joinder of offenses. 2'
The statute of 1855123 made it clear that a motion in arrest would not lie
as to joinder of the same class of offenses.'2 4 In 1883, it was stated broadly
that motion in arrest does not lie for misjoinder of offenses.'2 5 In 1892 the
Supreme Court said: "Having gone to trial, without objection, on the indict-
ment as consolidated under the last order of the court, it was not open to any
of them to take the objection for the first time after verdict." ' Several cases
since that date have applied the same rule.'27 In 1923 a court stated that,
"generally speaking the motion in arrest will not be sustained, unless the offenses
charged, and of which the defendant is found guilty, belong to different classes
of crimes requiring different judgment." 28
13. Motion to vacate judgment
Following trial and conviction on one count a defendant may not attack
a joinder of counts by motion to vacate judgment. 2 Such motion may not
take the place of motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment.
14. Appeal
Several cases have held that there is no right to review a denial of a motion
to quash for misjoinder of offenses.' But there is contrary authority.' Other
cases have held that there is no right to review of a decision refusing to compel
the government to elect between offenses as the motion is addressed to the dis-
cretion of the court; 2 however, the courts have reviewed the issue and found
120 Powers v. United States, 293 Fed. 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1923).
121 Stokes v. United States, 93 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 558
(1938).
122 Spirou v. United States, 24 Fed. 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928).
123 10 Stat. 161 (1857).
124 United States v. O'Callahan, 27 Fed. Cas. 216 (No. 15910) (C.C.N.D. Ohio, 1855).
125 United States v. Bayaud, 16 Fed. 376, 386 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
126 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 297 (1892).
127 Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1938); Acevedo v. United
States, 49 F.2d 1023, 1024 (1st Cir. 1931); Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015
(5th Cir. 1931); Phillips v. United States, 264 Fed. 657, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 253
U.S. 491 (1920); Orth v. United States, 252 Fed. 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1905). See United
States v. Loring, 91 Fed. 881, 887 (N.D. Ill. 1884), in which the court considered the motion
and then denied it on the facts alleged. The motion was made on the ground that more
crimes were set out than a special statute permitted. See also Sasser v. United States, 29 F.2d
76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 836 (1928).
128 Moore v. United States, 288 Fed. 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also Sasser v.
United States, 29 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 836 (1938).
129 United States v. Malone, 9 Fed. 897, 898 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881).
130 Todd v. United States, 48 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1931); Goodfriend v. United States,
294 Fed. 148 (9th Cir. 1923); Andersen v. United States, 273 Fed. 20, 28, 30 (8th Cir. 1921);
Corbin v. United States, 264 Fed. 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1920); McGregor v. United States,
134 Fed. 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1904).
131 Crock v. United States, 289 Fed. 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
132 McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1904). The statement of the
court also covered refusal of a motion to quash. See also McNeil v. United States, 85 F.2d
698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Corbin v. United States, 264 Fed. 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1920);
Sidebotham v. United States, 253 Fed. 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1918).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
no error. Another case did not deny review, but pointed out that granting a
request for election "depends upon the special circumstances of the case, and
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." ' In another case the appellate
court stated: "It is not for us here to require the government to elect; it may
or may not be the duty of the trial court to so require." 3 The appellate court
will not necessarily reverse, even though it would have been as well or better
to require an election;... it has been said the appellate court should not inter-
fere except where the trial court "discretion has been abused or manifest in-
justice has resulted.""' The court will not reverse unless the "substantial
rights" of the defendant were prejudiced by the denial of the motion to elect, 7
and no review will be permitted where the issue was not raised in the trial
court.'
Since severance of counts is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge, a denial of a severance will not be reviewed where no claim of injury
from the joinder was made and none of the evidence was brought up. 9
What about appellate review when the issue was not raised in the trial
court? In several cases the appellate court reviewed, but found no misjoinder. 40
Judgments entered on a plea of nolo contendere will not be reviewed for mis-
joinder;' 4' a defendant who has pleaded guilty may not raise the issue of joinder
for the first time on appeal;4 2 a misjoinder caused by variance of proof will
not result in reversal unless prejudicial to the defendants.'43
15. Habeas Corpus
It is doubtful that habeas corpus will lie for misjoinder when applied for
before trial and conviction.4 But the writ has been used to attack an erroneous
sentence, imposed following joinder of offenses. 4 ' It will not lie where the
offenses may be properly joined,'4 6 but has been resorted to in order to contend
that the offenses joined did not involve several offenses but rather one single
133 Lorenz v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 337, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1904).
134 Hyde v. United States, 27 App. D.C. 362, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1906).
135 Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1898).
136 Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908).
137 Bailey v. United States, 278 Fed. 849, 853 (6th Cir. 1922). See also: Dobbins v.
United States, 157 F.2d 257, 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 734 (1946); Morris v.
United States, 128 F.2d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 1942).
138 Lonergan v. United States, 88 Fed. 591, 594 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 663
(1937).
139 Morris v. United States, 128 F.2d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 1942).
140 United States v. Twentieth Century Bus Operators, 101 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1939);
Perez v. United States, 10 F.2d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1926); Crock v. United States, 289
Fed. 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Magon v. United States, 260 Fed. 811, 812 (9th Cir. 1919);
Kettenbach v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1913).
141 Dillon v. United States, 113 F.2d 334, 338 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 689
(1940). Here no misjoinder was found.
142 Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928).
143 United States v. Twentieth Century Bus Operators, 101 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1939).
144 The question was left undecided in Scott v. United States, 115 F.2d 137, 139 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 678 (1940). The petition for habeas corpus was inadequate in
form and the court decided on that ground.
145 Ex parte Joyce, 13 Fed. Cas. 1175 (No. 7556) (W.D. Mo. 1877). The joinder was
found proper, but not the sentence. See also Thomas v. Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 976 (10th Cir.
1942).
146 Ex parte Peters, 12 Fed. 461, 463 (W.D. Mo. 1880). See also Ex Parte Schaffenburg,
21 Fed. Cas. 1144, 1146 (No. 12696) (C.C.D. Col. 1877).
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continuous offense.14 Occasionally the same question arises on an appeal from
conviction and sentence. 4
C. Misjoinder of Defendants
1. Motion to quash
Misjoinder of defendants has been attacked by motion to quash. 49 The
motion was denied where the joinder was proper.' A motion to quash does
not lie when a corporate defendant is charged with a misdemeanor and an
individual defendant with a felony,'" as the individual defendant may move for
a separate trial and thus secure his full number of peremptory challenges. 5
Where any single count of an indictment is sufficient, misjoinder of other de-
fendants or offenses will not invalidate the indictment as a whole .' The
government could move to dismiss one or more counts; or the trial court could
order separate trials. The allegations of a motion to quash for misjoinder are not
admitted because no answer was made to the motion, as no answer is required,
and the defendant must support his motion. 5 Where there is a joinder of both
offenses and of defendants, a defendant attacking misjoinder must attempt to
point out which counts he considered improperly joined as to him.
2. Demurrer
Misjoinder of defendants has been attacked by demurrer.'55 The defect
may be cured by dismissal of defendants by the United States Attorney.'56
Joinder of several defendants and several offenses where all the defendants are
not charged with all the offenses has been successfully attacked by demurrer. 7
147 Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Ebeling v. Margan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915);
Tesciona v. Hunter, 151 F.2d 589, 591 (10th Cir. 1945); Dimenza v. Johnston, 130 F.2d
465 (9th Cir. 1942) (denial of habeas corpus was reversed); Bertsch v. Snook, 36 F.2d 155,
156 (5th Cir. 1929); Biddle v. Wilmot, 14 F.2d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 1926); Morgan v. Syl-
vester, 231 Fed. 886, 888 (8th Cir. 1916).
148 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Albrecht v. United States, 273
U.S. 1, 11 (1927); Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945); Fleisher v.
United States, 91 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1937); United States v. Mazzochi, 75 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1935); Beddow v. United States, 70 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1934).
149 Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1938); Culjak v. United States,
53 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1931); Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir.
1931); Filiatreau v. United States, 14 F.2d 659, 661 (6th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Kazinski, 26 Fed. Gas. 682 (No. 15508) (D. Mass. 1855).
150 Prettyman v. United States, 180 Fed. 30, 35 (6th C&. 1910); United States v. Mullen,
7 F.2d 244, 245 (E.D. La. 1925); United States v. McGinnis, 26 Fed. Gas. 1090, 1091 (No.
15678) (D.N.J. 1866).
151 Prettyman v. United States, 180 Fed. 30, 35 (6th Cir. 1910).
152 United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 43 F.2d 135, 144 (M.D. Pa. 1930).
153 Culjak v. United States, 96 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1931).
154 Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1938).
155 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943); New York Central R.R. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 481, 485, 497 (1908); United States v. Interstate Properties, 153
F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Curtis v. United States, 38 F.2d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 1930);
United States v. Geare, 293 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Prettyman v. United States, 180
Fed. 30, 35 (6th Cir. 1910); United States v. McAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823, 832
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906), error dismissed, 212 U.S. 585; United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed.
664, 665 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904); Ainsworth v. United States, 1 App. D.C. 518, 523 (D.C. Cir.
1893); United States v. Miller, 71 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D. Neb. 1946); United States v. Berry,
96 Fed. 842, 845 (W.D. Va. 1899); United States v. Davis, 33 Fed. 621 (E. D. Mo. 1887);
United States v. McDonald, 26 Fed. Cas. 1085 (No. 15670) (E.D. Mo. 1876).
156 United States v. McDonald, 26 Fed. Cas. 1085 (No. 15670) (E.D. Mo. 1876).
157 United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 664, 668 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904).
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3. Motion to dismiss indictment
Misjoinder of defendants has been attacked by a motion to dismiss the
indictment as to each defendant.'58 If the motion to dismiss was based on the
evidence introduced, the government might be put to an election.
4. Motion to compel election
Misjoinder of defendants may be attacked by a motion to compel an elec-
tion. 55 In fact, misjoinder of defendants should be objected to by motion to
compel an election, and not by demurrer or motion to quash. 6 If a motion to
dismiss is based upon the evidence introduced, the government might be put
to an election. 6' The motion to elect may be made at the end of the govern-
ment's evidence. "'
5. Motion to sever and for separate trial
One federal appellate court has held that the difficulty of obtaining a
fair and impartial trial under an indictment charging several defendants with
treason manifested by numerous overt acts, not all of which were participated
in by all the defendants, is not properly directed at the legality of the indict-
ment. "This is so for the reason that the court is empowered to prevent an
injustice of this character by severance or other means at its disposal in the
conduct of the trial."'
When three defendants were jointly indicted on ten counts and one de-
fendant pleaded guilty as to three counts, and the trial proceeded as to the other
two defendants without him, there was a severance as to him even though
there was no express ruling or order made by the court granting a severance. 4
The defendant or defendants may move for a separate trial. The facts
set forth in several reported cases show the granting of a motion for separate
trial. In one case where the indictment was of three persons for murder on
board an American vessel on the high seas, the motion of one defendant for a
separate trial was granted. s Apparently, an order for separate trials may be
set aside. This happened to the other two defendants in this case. 6 In one
case the defendant was indicted with several others in three indictments. One
158 Jaycox v. United States, 107 Fed. 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1901). The motion was made
before any evidence was introduced. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937
(W.D. Wis. 1938), the court dismissed the indictment of 11 defendants. See 72 HARv. L. Rnv.
920, 982 (1959). In some cases the government filed a nolle prosequi as to some of the
defendants. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 753 (1946).
159 Stokes v. United States, 93 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 1938); Dowling v. United States,
49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931); Brady v. United States, 39 F.2d 312, 313 (8th Cir.
1930); Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 492 (8th Cir. 1927); United States v. Mullen,
7 F.2d 244, 246 (E.D. La. 1925).
160 Todd v. United States, 48 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1931).
161 Jaycox v. United States, 107 Fed. 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1901). See United States v.
McDonald, 26 Fed. Cas. 1085 (No. 15670) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876).
162 United States v. Mullen, 7 F.2d 244, 246 (E.D. La. 1925).
163 United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 1943). See 29 HARv. L. REv.
334 (1916).
164 Coile v. United States, 100 F.2d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1939).
165 St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 137 (1894). See also United States v.
Matthews, 26 Fed. Cas. 1205 (No. 15741) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843).
166 Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 52 (1895).
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defendant was granted a separate trial, but the charges set forth in the three
indictments against him were consolidated for a single trial.' In some cases the
government has moved for and obtained severance of defendants."' No cases
have been found in which it clearly appears that severance was granted on the
court's own motion. The cases have not discussed the problem. 9
Where an indictment charges a corporate defendant with a misdemeanor
and an individual defendant with a felony, application for severance may be
made by the individual defendant or the government to assure that the indi-
vidual defendant is given the number of peremptory challenges allowed in
felony cases. 7 The government could also consent to trial of all the defendants
as if a felony were charged in-each case.
It is the view of some courts that where several offenses and several de-
fendants were involved, an indictment not naming each defendant in each
count was improper. The defendants might move either for a severance and a
separate trial, or to compel an election. 7' Even though some counts are dis-
missed as to some defendants, such defendants are not thereby entitled to sep-
arate trials. 7 2 A defendant jointly indicted may secure some protection by
asking for - and receiving- instructions with respect to the evidence.'73 A
court of appeal may reverse for inadequacy of instructions as to the evidence.1'
As early as 1825, Circuit Justice Washington held that the granting of
separate trials to defendants, jointly indicted, was a matter of discretion. 5
Separate trials could be denied, he said, where no sufficient reason was set
forth by the applicants, and where, if granted, "great consumption of time"
would be involved. The next year, Circuit Justice Story took a similar view
even where murder, a capital offense, was charged. "I do not cite authorities
on this point," he said, "because the law is familiar and well settled." The
167 Olson v. United States, 133 Fed. 849, 851 (8th Cir. 1904).
168 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 328, 333 (1892); DeLuca v. United States,
299 Fed. 741, 742 (2d "Cir. 1924). See United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. 699, 701
(No. 16730) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830), holding that it is optional for the government to proceed
jointly or separately. The court granted a separate trial, the government not opposing the
motion for separate trial. See also United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S . (12 Wheat.) 305,
306 (1827) to the same effect. Justice Story stated that "it is in the election of the prose-
cutor, whether there should be a joint or separate trial."
169 See ANNOT., 70 A.L.R. 1179 (1931).
170 United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. 43 F.2d 135, 144 (M.D. Pa. 1930). In
United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 580 (No. 16682) (C.C.D. Mass. 1826), Circuit Justice
Story stated as to capital offenses: "Where the trial is joint, the right to peremptory chal-
lenges is in no degree narrowed or affected." When the case went up to the Supreme Court,
he repeated this view. United States v. Marchant, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 305 (1827).
171 Stokes v. United States, 93 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 558
(1938).
172 Moore v. United States, 2 F.2d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S.
599 (1925).
173 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); Sparf and Hansen v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 58 (1895); Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193, 198 (8th Cir. 1930); United
States v. Rose, 31 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Ky. 1940); United States v. Holland, 26 Fed. Cas.
343 (No. 15377) (C.C.D.C. 1827).
174 Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1944).
175 United States v. Kelly, 26 Fed. Cas. 700, 701 (No. 15526) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). In
United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas. 1041, 1042 (No 16264) (C.C.D. Pa. 1815), a motion
for separate trial was granted because of antagonistic defenses, but the court did not discuss
the problem of discretion.
176 United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 580 (No. 16682) (C.C.D. Mass. 1826).
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defendants would not lose out with respect to peremptory challenges merely
because there was a joint trial. The Supreme Court, on a certificate of division
from the circuit court, affirmed this view in an opinion by Justice Story." He
stated: "The subject is not provided for by any act of congress; and therefore,
if the right can be maintained at all, it must be a right derived from the com-
mon law, which the courts of the United States are bound to recognize and
enforce." In the first instance, "it is in the election of the prosecutor, whether
there would be a joint or separate trial." ' The discretion of the trial court
"cannot be governed by fixed rules." '79 The court is more likely to grant a
separate trial in a capital case such as murder 6n the high seas. The rule of
discretion has been repeated in numerous cases.' The Statute of Jeofails'
of 1919 merely added "force to the long existing rule." 182
Several cases hold or imply that where the offenses of several defendants,
jointly indicted, are antagonistic to each other, separate trials should be grant-
ed. 8 3 Where seven defendants were jointly indicted, a motion of counsel for
three defendants for separate trial by a separate jury was granted on allegations
that their defenses were not only different, but at variance with those of the
other four, and that they might differ in making their challenges to the jurors.'
If there is no showing of antagonism of defenses, a separate trial will not be
granted,' and a court of appeal will not reverse where it was not clearly shown
that the defenses were antagonistic. 6 Antagonistic defenses, calculated to
prejudice one of several defendants jointly accused, will entitle him, but not
the others, to a separate trial.' 7
Several cases held or intimated that separate trials should be granted when
it appears that a defendant would be prejudiced on a joint trial by the reception
of evidence which is not admissible against him, but which is competent against
177 United States v. Marchant 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 305 (1827).
178 Id. at 306. See also United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. 699, 701 (No. 16730)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830).
179 United States v. Matthews, 26 Fed. Gas. 1205, 1206 (No. 15741) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1843). A separate trial was granted. What constitutes abuse of discretion depends on the
whole situation as shown by the record in each case. Brady v. United States, 39 F.2d 312,
313 (8th "Cir. 1930).
180 See the numerous cases cited in ANNOT., A.L.R. 1172-73 (1931); ANNOT., 104 A.L.R.
1519 (1936); ANNOT., 131 A.L.R. 918 (1941). For decisions of the Supreme Court, see
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585 (1919); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,
672 (1896).
181 Now: FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
182 McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 136 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 697
(1937).
183 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d
490, 493 (8th Cir. 1927); United States v. Noble, 294 Fed. 689, 691 (D. Mont. 1923);
United States v. Rockefeller, 222 Fed. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); United States v. Collyer,
25 Fed. Cas. 554, 561 (No. 14838) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855); United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed.
Gas. 1041, 1042 (No. 16294) (C.C.D. Pa. 1815).
184 United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas. 1041, 1042 (No. 16294) (C.C.D. Pa. 1815).
See the critical comment by Circuit Justice Story as to this case in United States v. White,
28 Fed. Gas. 580, 584 (No. 16682) (C.C.D. Mass. 1826). But he was inclined to accept
the doctrine of separate trial in case of antagonistic defenses.
185 United States v. Collyer, 25 Fed. Cas. 554, 561 (No. 14838) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855).
186 Brady v. United States, 39 Fed. 312, 313 (8th Cir. 1930).
187 United States v. Noble, 294 Fed. 589, 691 (D. Mont. 1923). See 36 COLUM. L. Rv.
1359, 1360 (1936).
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his co-defendant."s' But a refusal is justified when the jury is properly instructed
concerning the application of the evidence and no prejudice has in fact resulted
from trying the defendants jointly.'8
9
An antitrust case is illustrative of this. The prosecution was brought against
the directors of a railway; an earlier suit had been dismissed and five directors
had been replaced in the interim. The court held that the five new directors
were entitled to a separate trial in the new action, due to differences in evidence,
defenses, and the possibility of antagonism to the other directors' defenses."'
The government stated that it did not oppose the severance.
To summarize, it is ground for severance if the law applicable to one
defendant may not apply to another. In this case- an indictment for viola-
tion of the Clayton Act-some defendants were elected directors before its
passage and some after. Where the government does not oppose the motion,
separate trial has been granted on application of one defendant, on the ground
that the defense of one prisoner will implicate the other, or others. 9'
A confession of one of two defendants, jointly charged and tried for the
same crime, is inadmissible against the other, if the confession was made in the
absence of the other and after the crime was committed. 9 ' In such case, a
new trial will be ordered. But it is not error to admit in evidence a confession
of one co-conspirator in the joint trial of himself and others, where the jury
is instructed that it may be considered only as against him.'93 In a prosecution
for aiding and abetting murder, for instance, the defendant was entitled to a
separate trial from that of his principal, when the principal made a confession
involving the defendant which was not admissible in its entirety as to the de-
fendant, but admissible as to the principal.'" A defendant jointly indicted for
conspiracy to use the mails to defraud is not entitled to a severance because a
co-defendant had pleaded guilty in a state court to a charge of larceny. 9
In cases where one defendant desires to use his co-defendant or another
incompetent witness in a joint trial as witness in his behalf, there has been a
good deal of uncertainty whether a severance should be granted.'96 There was
some authority holding that a severance could be granted, 9' but in 1834 it was
definitely held for the first time that separate trials need not be granted so that
defendants might use the testimony of each other in their defense. 9 It made
188 Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927); Olmstead v. United States,
19 F.2d 842 (9th Gir. 1927); United States v. Rockefeller, 222 Fed. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
189 United States v. Rose, 31 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Ky. 1940).
190 United States v. Rockefeller, 222 Fed. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
191 United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Gas. 699, 701 (No. 16730) (E.D. Pa. 1830). The
court was silent as to two other reasons assigned by the defendant: (1) that evidence of the
confessions of one of the defendants would be given by the government; and (2) that the
defendants wished to examine the wife of one of the defendants as a witness.
192 Sorenson v. United States, 143 Fed. 820, 821 (8th Cir. 1906). See also United
States v. Matthews, 26 Fed. Gas. 1205 (No. 15741) ('3.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843).
193 Johnson v. United States, 82 F.2d 500, 504 (6th. Cir), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 688
(1936); Hagen v. United States, 268 Fed. 344, 345 (9th Cir. 1920).
194 Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1928).
195 United States v. Fradkin, 81 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 720
(1936).
196 ANNOT., 70 A.L.R. 1187 (1931).
197 O'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed. 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1924).
198 United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Gas. 1287, 1303 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
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no difference that such testimony could not be used in a joint trial. Justice
Story doubted that a trial court may make a witness competent by an act of
its own, such as granting a severance. The rights of the government deserve
protection. Separate trial had never previously been granted solely on such a
ground. To grant a separate trial could be an abuse of sound discretion. In
another case, in which two defendants were indicted for assault and battery,
counsel for the defendants asked for separate trials, as he wished to examine
each as a witness for the other. The Circuit Court stated that it was perhaps
in the discretion of the court to allow it, but the defendants could not claim
it as a matter of right.'99 Neither can be examined as a witness for the other
unless it should appear that there is no evidence against one, in which case the
jury may acquit him, and he may then be examined for the other. But if there
be any evidence against him, he cannot be examined. In another early case,
the court, on motion of a defendant jointly indicted for larceny on the high
seas, permitted the co-defendant to be separately tried so that he could be used
as a witness for the defendant in the event of an acquittal.' ° Finally, in 1851,
the Supreme Court held that, even where two persons were jointly indicted, but
were tried separately, the defendant first tried could not call the other as a
witness in his behalf.20 ' The court did not hold that the defendant tried after
the first defendant could not call the first defendant if he had been acquitted.
Thus, grant of a separate trial while of no advantage to the defendant first tried,
would be of advantage to the defendant thereafter tried.
Under a statute of 1878,2 providing that in the trial of persons charged
with criminal offenses in the federal courts "the person so charged shall, at his
own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness," one of two defendants
jointly indicted may, at his own request, be examined as a witness by the gov-
ernment.' It made no difference that the other defendant objected. The
court stated that a co-defendant could at his own request also testify for the
other defendant.'0 4 But apparently he could not be compelled to testify.
20 5
Suppose a defendant wished to have the testimony of the wife of a co-
199 United States v. Davidson, 25 Fed. Cas. 773 (No. 14922) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1841). The
co-defendant was acquitted and then testified favorably for the defendant who was also
acquitted. In United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Gas. 131, 135 (No. 15301) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1846) the court granted a new trial after conviction at a joint trial but not because of the
contentions made by the defendants. The trial judge had died pending the motion for new
trial, and for that reason the motion was granted. At the new trial it seems that the trial
was again joint. 26 Fed. Cas. 138.
200 United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 784, 785 (No. 14931) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1841).
201 In United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 383, 387 (1851), the law of 1789
where the federal court sat was applied. For the case below see United States v. Clements,
25 Fed. Cas. 467, 474 (No. 14817) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1851). The court below held that in
case of joint indictment but separate trial a co-defendant is not competent unless he has been
acquitted. On motion for new trial the two judges were divided, so the case was certified to
the Supreme Court. 25 Fed. Cas. 479. The case was followed in United States v. Collyer,
25 Fed. Cas. 554, 561 (No. 14838) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855).
202 20 Stat. 30 (1878).
203 Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1900). See also United States
v. Noble, 294 Fed. 689, 691 (D. Mont. 1923).
204 Id. at 436; accord: Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892) (dictum).
205 Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 1927). The court of appeals
in upholding conviction pointed out that the defendant who moved for severance testified
in his own behalf and that it did not "affirmatively appear that his defense was in any way
hampered by his inability to adduce testimony from others."
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defendant. In an early case a court stated: "On examining the question, I
find the rule to be, that, when trials are separate, the wife may testify in favor
of any one other than her husband, except in cases where the acquittal of one
defendant works the acquittal of the rest as'in cases of conspiracy, and the
like." 20 In a subsequent case, it was held that, where separate defenses are
interposed by defendants, jointly indicted, and there may be a separate con-
viction or acquittal of each, the wife of one is a competent witness for the other,
and a defendant is entitled to a severance in order to have such testimony if
it is otherwise material.20 7 A number of cases left open the question whether
the wife could testify for a co-defendant at a separate trial.0 8 Several cases held
that she was not a competent witness for a co-defendant at a joint trial.
209
Ultimately, however, it was held that a wife could be a competent witness in
behalf of her husband.2 10 It would seem to follow that the spouse of a co-
defendant may testify for a defendant whether the trial be separated or joint.1 '
It has also been held that granting a separate trial to one of several jointly
indicted for conspiracy is within the discretion of the trial judge, reviewable
only in case of abuse.21 2 Severances in conspiracy cases are granted only for
compelling reasons.213 It is not granted merely because the moving party played
a minor role in the conspiracy and thus was directly involved in only a small
part of the evidence to be presented; 4 or because a co-defendant has already
been convicted under state law for the same offense; 1 5 or because severance
could permit him to utilize testimony of co-defendants in his own behalf;rse
or because it is alleged that the number of defendants will interfere with his
206 United States v. Addate, 299 Fed. 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1924). The facts showed that
the trial court offered to allow the witness to testify, but the defendant did not call her.
Hence the issue was not squarely before the court.
207 O'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed. 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1924). The facts showed that
the trial court offered to allow the witness to testify, but the defendant did not call her. Hence
the issue was not squarely before the court.
208 Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1931); Israel v. United States,
3 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1925); United States v. Wade, 28 Fed. Cas. 386 (No. 16629)
(C.C.D.C. 1826).
209 Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1931); Allen v. United State,
4 F.2d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 1925); Israel v. United States, 3 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1925)
(where wife's testimony would affect the husband's defense); Haddad v. United States, 294
Fed. 536, 537 (6th Cir. 1923); Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567, 576 (2d Cir. 1916);
Talbott v. United States, 208 Fed. 144, 145 (5th Cir. 1913); United States v. Liddy, 2 F.2d
60, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1924); United States v. Davidson, 285 Fed. 661, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1922);
United States v. Wade, 28 Fed. Cas. 386 .(No. 16629) (C.C.D.C. 1826). But see Tinsley
v. United States, 43 F.2d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 1930); Green v. United States, 19 F.2d 850,
853 (9th Cir. 1927); O'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed. 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1924).
210 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380 (1933).
211 19 IowA. L. REV. 488, 489 (1934).
212 Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 135, 144 (1913). See also Hammerschridt v.
United States, 287 Fed. 817, 823 (6th Cir. 1923). One of the two conspirators was tried
separately in Miller v. United States, 277 Fed. 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1921). See also Vannata
v. United States, 289 Fed. 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1923), where one conspirator was indicted alone
and tried alone; and Goldberg v. United States, 297 Fed. 98, 101 (5th 'Cir. 1924).
213 United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
214 Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193, 198 (8th Cir. 1930); United States v. Lang,
40 F. Supp. 414, 416 (B.D.N.Y. 1941).
215 United States v. Fradlin, 81 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 720
(1936).
216 Oimstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1927), aff'd, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
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right to have his guilt individually adjudicated."' A defendant is not entitled
to severance in a conspiracy case because he has previously represented his co-
defendants as attorney in proceedings against them in the same court, and
received from them many confidential communications in relation to matters
involved in the present case."'
It would seem that there could be abuse from the admission of a co-
defendant's implicating confession in a conspiracy trial.219 Judicial and extra-
judicial confessions by a co-conspirator after the termination of the conspiracy
are not admissible as evidence against the non-declaring defendant.22 But
when joint defendants are on trial, implicating confessions are admissible if the
jury is instructed that such confessions are evidence only against the declaring
defendant.221 The admonition is said to safeguard the rights of the non-con-
fessing defendant.222 What seems to be contrary authority arises in non-con-
spiracy cases. A conviction has been reversed even where the proper admoni-
tion was given on the ground that the defendant's motion for severance should
have been granted as to one accused of abetting murder where the principal's
confession was admitted.222 Some cases assert that the jury does heed the ad-
monition and that the evidentiary effect of the confession is therefore limited
to the confessing defendant.2 24 Some courts, while doubting the value of the
admonition, defend the rule as furthering the judicial search for truth.225
A large number of defendants does not seem to be sufficient grounds for
severance.22 Most of the illustrative cases have involved liquor violations. In
one of the few cases not in that category a court of appeals affirmed where
separate trials were denied to 22 defendants indicted for transporting stolen
automobiles in interstate commerce.227 In a case in which 75 persons were indict-
ed for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act, 63 went to trial, 55
were convicted, and 42 appealed. It was held not error to proceed to trial with
all the defendants.22 The court of appeals did refer to the possibility of trial
of groups. One trial is desirable in order to avoid repetition, the difficulty of
217 Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5, 11 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 671
(1933); United States v. Gilbert, 31 F. Supp. 195, 199 (S.D. Ohio 1939). See Note, 13
NEB. L. BULL. 151 (1934).
218 Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1927).
219 Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1112, 1113 (1956).
220 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946); Brown v. United States, 150
U.S. 93, 98 (1893); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 309 (1892). See also Gambino
v. United States, 108 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1939); United States v. Corso, 100 F.2d 604, 605
(7th Cir. 1938); Holt v. United States, 94 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1937); Seeman v. United
States, 90 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1937); Mayola v. United States, 71 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir.
1934); Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 427 (4th Cir. 1931); Feder v. United States,
257 Fed. 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1919); Fain v. United States, 200 Fed. 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1913).
221 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 692 (1896); Rich v. United States, 62 F.2d 638,
640 (1st Cir. 1933); Gwinn v. United States, 294 Fed. 878, 880 (5th Cir. 1923).
222 Johnson v. United States, 82 F.2d 500, 504. (6th Cir. 1936).
223 Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1928).
224 Johnson v. United States, 82 F.2d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 1936).
225 United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945); Nash v. United States,
54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932).
226 Note, 13 NEB. L. BULL, 151 (1934).
227 Waldeck v. United States, 2 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 595
(1925).
228 Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688, 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1925). See 62 HARV. L. REV.
276, 282 (1948).
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classifying into groups, and representation by many lawyers. On the other
hand, the jury might be confused; the government cannot focus its attack; and
the trial judge encounters administrative difficulties. In another case, 91 de-
fendants were indicted for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act
and 21 were convicted, some not apprehended, some acquitted, and some
pleaded guilty. The court of appeals held that the trial court could in its dis-
cretion deny separate trials in conspiracy cases." 9 In another case 29 defendants
were indicted; 23 were tried, of whom 11 were dismissed, a verdict of acquittal
directed as to seven, and there was a verdict of guilty as to five. The question
as to separate trial did not arise as an issue but the court of appeals stated that
the practice of submitting to a jury, in one trial, the question of
the guilt of thirty or fifty citizens, where the testimony as to each
is different, is not to be encouraged. It is extremely difficult for an
experienced trial judge to trace the skeins of scattered testimony
to so many individuals; with inexperienced jurors, such complicated
testimony is apt to become but a confused jumble, and a verdict is
too apt to represent an impression that the defendants are guilty
of something, with little reference to the crime with which they are
charged.
23 0
In one case 86 defendants were indicted, 59 went to trial and 36 were found
guilty. The court of appeals affirmed, although it pointed out that grouping
the defendants for several trials might at times be advisable. 3 ' In an unreported
case, 90 defendants were indicted. There was a dismissal as to all but 57.
These were tried over an eight-week period. The court directed verdicts for
seven, and on its own motion granted mistrials as to all those remaining except
16. The case went to the jury as to the 16, and the jury failed to agree.2"2 In
one case, after a jury verdict of guilty as to 30 individuals and 16 corporations,
the trial court dismissed the indictment or granted a new trial as to 25 indi-
viduals and four corporations.233 The trial had lasted almost four months. In
one case 41 persons were indicted and tried together under an indictment for
conspiracy to obstruct the passage of the mail, and one for conspiracy to restrain
trade or commerce. 3 4 The defendants were union members, and 34 appealed;
the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Where two indict-
ments for using the mails to defraud and for conspiracy were returned against
53 defendants and consolidated, separate trials were refused.2 35 The court
rejected the argument that expense to the government by separate trials is a bar
229 Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1927). Nine defendants
appealed.
230 Marcante v. United States, 49 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir. 1931). There was a reversal
because of insufficient evidence. To similar effect see Booth v. United States, 57 F.2d 192,
197 (10th Cir. 1932). The court did not reverse because it concluded that upon the whole
record the defendant had had a fair trial. One judge dissented. Ninety six persons indicted.
The trial lasted three weeks.
231 Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 3, 11 (7th Cir. 1932). In United States v. Heitler,
274 Fed. 401, 406 (N.D. Ill. 1921) the trial court referred to the difficulty of trying a case
involving more than 30 defendants; but denied a new trial.
232 United States v. Dennison (D. Neb. 1933) discussed in Note, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 151
(1934); Note, 72 HAxv. L. REV. 920, 982 (1959).
233 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938). See Note, 72
HARv. L. Rv. 920, 982 (1959); Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1046, 1047 (1959).
234 United States v. Anderson, 101 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1939).
235 United States v. Gilbert, 31 F. Supp. 195, 199 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
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to severance. But it pointed out that instructions to the jury would protect the
defendants and that offenses such as conspiracy contemplated a number of
defendants. Cases involving numerous defendants often take a long time to
try, thus taxing the memory of the tribunal. In a sedition trial of 30 defen-
dants the trial lasted seven months; the death of the trial judge made it neces-
sary to declare a mistrial. 6 Eventually there was a dismissal because of delay
in prosecution." 7 In 1943, Judge Jerome Frank dissented to the trial of numer-
ous defendants. He stated:
More ought to be done, I think, to prevent prosecutors from
employing the excuse of need for "expedition" to use, unnecessarily,
conspiracy trials, in which large numbers of defendants are herded
into one suit, instead of bringing several actions. The trial dockets
are not so congested as to compel such omnibus trials. Any district
judge can do much to meet this situation by exercising his discre-
tion, on his own motion to compel severance.""
When numerous defendants and multiple conspiracies are involved, the
difficulties are enhanced. In a leading decision, the court held that the govern-
ment could not string together for common trial eight or more separate and
distinct conspiracies, related in kind though they might be, when the only nexus
among them lies in the fact that one man participated in all.2 "' This was not
a case of harmless error. The indictment itself changed only one conspiracy.
There is an all-important difference between a case" in which two conspiracies
involving four persons are proved, and a case where eight conspiracies involv-
ing originally 32 persons are involved though the case went to trial only as to
19 and the names of 13 were submitted to the jury and seven were convicted.
Defendants charged with criminal contempt were not entitled to separate trials
where the evidence was almost identical and the trial judge could have easily
separated the facts.24 It made no difference that the contempts of the other
defendants occurred the day before the contempt of the defendant who moved
for a separate trial.
Severance will not be granted where the moving party files affidavits alleging
innocence and the government's inability to prove guilt.242 A defendant may
not have a separate trial for a narcotics offense merely because he is under
indictment for murder in the state court.243 It is not ground for a separate trial
236 United States v. McWilliams, 54 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1944); Note, 68 HAuv. L.
REv. 1046, 1047 (1955).
237 United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
238 United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1001, 1004 (2d Cir. 1943).
239 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766, 773 (1946), reversing, 151 F.2d 170
(2d Cir. 1945). Two justices dissented. The case is noted in 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 992
(1959); 26 BoSTON U.L. REV. 386, 401 (1957). It was followed in Canella v. United States,
157 F.2d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1946). A proceeding on five conspiracies involving 12 persons
was improper.
240 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81 (1935). See comments in 72 HARv. L. REv.
920, 991 (1959); 57 COLUm. L. REv. 387, 398 (1957); 48 HARv. L. Rav. 515 (1935).
241 Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 1936).
242 United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
243 United States v. Cohen, 124 F.2d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811
(1942). The same case held that two other defendants were not entitled to separate trials
merely because they had acted as spies for the police or because they might have given some
of the evidence leading to the trial, or because their co-defendants were hostile to them.
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that a co-defendant was kept handcuffed in the presence of the jury.2 -
6. Motion for directed verdict
In one case, improper joinder of defendants was attacked by a motion
for a directed verdict made after the government had put in its evidence. On
denial of the motion the defendants appealed and obtained a reversal.4 5 In
one case, on election between two defendants, the court directed a verdict in
favor of the defendant not elected.24 In cases involving numerous defendants,
directed verdicts are often granted as to some of the defendants.""
7. Motion for mistrial
In an unreported case 90 defendants were indicted; 57 were tried over a
period of eight weeks. The court directed verdicts for seven; and on its own
motion granted mistrials as to all the remaining 16.48 In a sedition trial of 30
defendants, the trial lasted seven months; the death of the trial judge made it
necessary to declare a mistrial.249
8. Time of attack on joinder
The facts of several cases indicate that attacks on joinder were made before
arraignment and plea.25
At what time should the defendants move for a separate trial? One court
has stated:
At the time such preliminary question arises the judge, not
being in possession of other facts than those disclosed on the face of
the indictment, must act thereon until a clear showing made on the
part of the objecting defendant that his interests will be seriously
prejudiced by a joint trial. And where it becomes apparent to the
presiding judge in the progress of the trial that injustice may be done
to any defendant by such joint trial, it is to be presumed that he
will afford relief by awarding a new trial.
25
In one case the defendant moved at the conclusion of the evidence. 52 One
court has stated with respect to both joinder of defendants and of offenses:
"If the defendant is embarrassed by such a fault in the indictment against him,
he should in advance of trial move to quash it, or for a severance, or to compel
the prosecutor to elect on which counts he shall be put to trial. He cannot take
244 McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 136 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 697
(1937).
245 Brimie v. United States, 200 Fed. 726, 727, 730 (7th 10ir. 1912). In another case
the court of appeals in reversing stated that the trial court should have directed a verdict
for the defendant at the end of the evidence. Nazzaro v. United States, 56 F.2d 1026, 1028
(10th Cir. 1932).
246 United States v. Mullen, 7 F.2d 244, 246 (E.D. La. 1925).
247 Marcante v. United States, 49 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir. 1931); United States v.
Dennison (D. Neb. 1933), discussed in Note, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 151 (1934); Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 753 (1946).
248 United States v. Dennison, (D. Neb. 1933), discussed in Note, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 151
(1934); see Note, 72 HARv. L. Rav. 920, 982 (1959).
249 United States v. MeWilliams, 54 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1944). See Note, 68 HARv.
L. REv. 1046, 1047 (1955).
250 See, e.g., United States v. Mellor, 71 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Neb. 1946).
251 Krause v. United States, 147 Fed. 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1906).
252 Milner v. United States, 293 Fed. 590 (5th Cir. 1923).
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the chance of acquittal on a trial and object to misjoinder only after convic-
tion." 253
9. Motion for new trial
A defendant denied a separate trial has, after conviction, sometimes moved
for a new trial.254 Where the defendants, before impaneling of the jury had
requested a severance, but severance was erroneously denied, a new trial was
granted.255 But new trial will not be granted merely because one or more de-
fendants are acquitted, others are convicted, and there is disagreement as to
others.256 In one case the court ordered a new trial for 18 defendants after a
four-month trial and a jury verdict of guilty.
2 7
10. Motion in arrest of judgment
Misjoinder of defendants may not be attacked for the first time on motion




Where the defendants at the opening of the trial move for separate trials
on the ground of misjoinder and the trial court denies the motion, the appellate
court may reverse.26 This is true when under a joint indictment, different
defendants are convicted of distinct and separate offenses. A failure of the
defendants to move for separate trial because of misjoinder may bar reversal
on appeal where several verdicts are rendered, but not when a single joint ver-
dict is rendered.26' Misjoinder of defendants, both where the defendants have
been convicted after trial, and where they have pleaded guilty, cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.262
The appellate courts are reluctant to review a denial of a motion for
separate trials.26 One court stated:
Neither was there reversible error in the action of the court in
refusing the request of defendants for separate trials. In practice
this is matter resting largely in the sound discretion of the trial
court, which will not be reviewed in the absence of clear indications
253 Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931). In Lotsch v. United
States, 102 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 622 (1939), the court merely
assumed this view to be correct without committing itself.
254 United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 383 (1851); United States v. Noble, 294
Fed. 689, 690 (D. Mont. 1923).
255 United States v. Decker, 51 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D. Md. 1943).
256 United States v. LeFanti, 255 Fed.'210, 214 (D.N.J. 1919).
257 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938).
258 Sasser v. United States, 29 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 836
(1929); see also Dowling v. United States, 49 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1931). In Stokes
v. United States, 93 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 1938), the motion in arrest was made after
the overruling of a motion for a directed verdict.
259 Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928).
260 Coco v. United States, 289 Fed. 33, 34 (8th Cir. 1923). The motion was to split the
defendants into two groups for two trials.
261 Brimie v. United States, 200 Fed. 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1912).
262 Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928).
263 See the cases cited at ANNOT., 131 A.L.R. 926 (1941); ANNOT., 104 A.L.R. 1525
(1936); 70 A.L.R. 1191 (1931).
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that serious prejudice resulted therefrom, to one or more of the
defendants.
2 64
One court of appeal, in granting a new trial, stated: "This discretion, how-
ever, like any other vested in the trial court is, if abused, subject to review and
correction." 26 5 Judge Jerome Frank, in a dissenting opinion, has insisted on
the rule that, if error is shown, there must be reversal unless it affirmatively
appears from the whole record that it was not prejudicial. 6 6
12. Habeas corpus
Misjoinder of defendants has been successfully attacked by habeas corpus
on a proceeding to remove the defendant from one federal district to another."
D. Consolidation of Indictments
1. Resistance to motion to consolidate
Where the government files a motion to consolidate several indictments,
the defendant may resist the motion.26 ' Affidavits may be filed both in support
of the motion, and in opposition thereto.269
2. Motion to compel election
Where there is improper consolidation of indictments, the court may com-
pel the government to elect."' One court has stated:
Of course the authority to direct that separate indictments be
tried together should be exercised with caution lest the defendant
be confounded in his defense or otherwise prejudiced thereby, and
if at any time in the course of such a trial it is discovered that it
tends to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant the court.
should compel the prosecutor to elect upon which indictment he
will proceed.
2 7 1
Election has been ordered during the trial.12 No election would be required
where the indictments grew out of one transaction." No election need be
264 Krause v. United States, 147 Fed. 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1906). Accord, Riddle v. United
States, 279 Fed. 216, 220 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 586 (1922).
265 United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 672 (7th Cir. 1943).
266 United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1001, 1005 (2d Cir. 1943).
267 United States v. Morse, 287 Fed. 906, 911 (D. Conn. 1923).
268 Jarvis v. United States, 90 F.2d 243, 244 (10th Cir. 1937); Deluca v. United States,
299 Fed. 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1924); Kelly v. United States, 258 Fed. 392, 403 (6th Cir. 1919);
United States v. Bopp, 237 Fed. 283, 284 (N.D. Cal. 1916). In United States v. Frankfeld,
38 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (D.D.C. 1941) the motion to consolidate was denied. In United
States v. Carnegie Illinois Steel Corporation, 53 F. Supp. 814 (W.D. Pa. 1944) it was granted
as in United States v. Kovich 66 F. Supp. 579 (D. Wash. 1946).
269 United States v. Bopp, 237 Fed. 283, 284 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
270 United States v. Silverman, 106 F.2d 750, 753 (3d Cir. 1939); United States v. Ander-
son, 101 F.2d 325, 327, 333 (7th Cir. 1939); Castelini v. United States, 64 F.2d 636 (6th Cir.
1933) (appellate court reversed a consolidation); Davis v. United States, 12 F.2d 253, 254
(5th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 271 U.S. 688 (1926) (election ordered at trial); Lemon v. United
States, 164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908); Brown v. United States, 143 Fed. 60, 67 (8th
Cir. 1906); Dolan v. United States, 133 Fed. 440, 446 (8th Cir. 1904); United States v.
Gilbert, 31 F. Supp. 195, 198 (S.D. Ohio, 1939).
271 Brown v. United States, 143 Fed. 60, 67 (8th Cir. 1906).
272 Davis v. United States, 12 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 688
(1926). The election resulted in the dropping of one indictment out of four.
273 Johnson v. United States, 82 F.2d 500, 504 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 688
(1936); Silverman v. United States, 59 F.2d 636, 637 (1st Cir. 1932).
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ordered where the crimes charged are of the same class and are closely con-
nected." 4
Where there are two indictments found against a defendant but trial of
only one, there is no obligation to consolidate, nor any duty on the government
to elect between the indictments.' At least this is true when the defendant
fails to object until after trial.
3. Motion to sever
In one case, in which two indictments against one defendant were con-
solidated, the defendant attacked the consolidation by a motion for severance." 6
Where several indictments involve several defendants, individual defendants
may sometimes secure a severance from other defendants, followed by a requested
consolidation of indictments and trial separately of the several defendants.2 7
The government may secure such severance of defendants followed by consoli-
dation of indictments and trial separately of the several defendants."7 Where
there is improper consolidation as to several defendants, the court of appeals
will reverse.2 79
4. Cure by verdict or otherwise
Where there has been an improper consolidation of two indictments, an
acquittal under one indictment does not necessarily cure the error where there
is a conviction under the other.8 ' Consolidation may often be prevented from
becoming prejudicial by proper instructions to the jury.2"' Where two indict-
ments are consolidated, but one is dismissed before submission to the jury,
there can be no prejudicial error.28 2 If the view be taken that there can be no
consolidation unless all defendants be included in all indictments, this may be
cured by a severance as to defendants not included in all.28 3 A defendant is not
necessarily prejudiced by consolidation as to being joined with another if the
charges against the other are withdrawn from the jury before the case is sub-
mitted to them.8 4
5. Motion for new trial
A consolidation of three indictments against one defendant is not ground
274 United States v. Hibbs, 152 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1945); United States v. Hall,
52 F. Supp. 796 (D. Conn. 1943).
275 Fullerton v. United States, 213 Fed. 631 (9th Cir. 1914). See also United States v.
Gilbert, 31 F. Supp. 195, 198 (S.D. Ohio, 1939).
276 United States v. Silverman, 106 F.2d 750, 751 (3d Cir. 1939).
277 Kettenbach v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 381 (9th 'Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 613
(1913). See Rose v. United States, 45 F.2d 459, 460 (8th Cir. 1930).
278 DeLuca v. United States, 299 Fed. 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1924). But on the particular
facts, consolidation was denied, as the offenses were not related.
279 Zedd v. United States, 11 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1926).
280 Castellini v. United States, 64 F.2d 636, 638 (6th Cir. 1933).
281 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1946); Kelly
v. United States, 258 Fed. 392, 403 (6th Cir. 1919).
282 Cohen v. United States, 35 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1929).
283 United States v. Kelley, 105 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1939).
284 United States v. Glass, 30 F. Supp. 397, 399 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
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for new trial where the consolidation is proper.285 A motion for new trial has
been denied to a single moving party where there was a consolidation of indict-
ments involving several defendants and offenses where the consolidation was
proper."' 8 But a new trial was granted where the defendant had requested
a severance, and the evidence showed that fair trial required a separate trial.'
A new trial was granted when the indictments involved different persons in the
various indictments."88 A trial judge may properly deny a new trial sought by
several defendants where no prejudice was suffered by the consolidation."s
6. Motion in arrest of judgment
Consolidation has been attacked by motion in arrest of judgment.2" But
the motion will not be granted if all the counts in all the indictments could
have been included in one indictment in the first instance." 1 The motion should
be granted when consolidation is improper, e.g., where different defendants
are involved in the various indictments. "2
7. Motion to vacate order of consolidation




Where the defendant objects to improper consolidation before or at the
trial, the appellate court will review the error.294 In some cases the appellate
court has reviewed and found no improper consolidation even though it does
not clearly appear that objection was made seasonably in the trial court. 95
There may be a reversal when two indictments for a single offense are consoli-
dated and two penalties are imposed.29 Where the record contains no tran-
285 United States v. Ancarola, 1 Fed. 676, 677 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880). See also Williams
v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 385, 390 (1897); Porter v. United States, 91 Fed. 494, 495
(5th Cir. 1898).
286 United States v. Glass, 30 F. Supp. 397, 400 (W.D. Ky. 1939). See also United States
v. Liddy, 2 F.2d 60, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
287 United States v. Decker, 51 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D. Md. 1943).
288 McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 77, 81 (1896); Callaghan v. United States,
299 Fed. 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1924).
289 Kelly v. United States, 258 Fed. 392, 403 (6th Cir. 1919).
290 Turner v. United States, 66 Fed. 280, 281 (5th Cir. 1895).
291 Id. at 285. See also: Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 391 (1897); United
States v. Ancarola, 1 Fed. 676, 677 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
292 McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 77 (1896).
293 Ryan v. United States, 216 Fed. 13, 27, 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 726
(1914).
294 McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 80 (1896); Castellini v. United States, 64
F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1933) (consolidation reversed); Carter v. United States, 38 F.2d 227
(5th Cir. 1930); Zedd v. United States, 11 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1926) (consolidation reversed);
DeLuca v. United States, 299 Fed. 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1924) (consolidation reversed); Jacob-
sen v. United States, 272 Fed. 399, 400 (7th Cir. 1920).
295 United States v. Smith, 112 F.2d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1940); Rose v. United States, 45
F.2d 459, 460 (8th Cir. 1930); Hostetter v. United States, 16 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir. 1926);
Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1926); Edwards v. United States, 7
F.2d 598, 599, 601 (8th Cir. 1925); Frieden v. United States, 5 F.2d 556, 557 (4th Cir.
1925); Goldberg v. United States, 297 Fed. 98, 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1924); Krause v. United
States, 147 Fed. 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1906).
296 United States v. Mazzohi, 75 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1935).
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script of the proceedings, the appellate court will not reverse because it cannot
know whether the indictments involved offenses connected together, or whether
any possible prejudice was minimized by the instructions." 7
Where the defendant or defendants go to trial without objection to con-
solidation, they may not object for the first time after verdict or on appeal.2
They may consider consolidation more advantageous or more convenient. If
the defendant himself requested consolidation, he cannot later object." 9 A
failure to object to consolidation before trial may result in loss of peremptory
challenges for several indictments."0
A court of appeal has stated that consolidation is "confided to the sound
discretion of the trial court, with the exercise of which we ought not to interfere
except in cases where that discretion has been abused or manifest injustice has
resulted." 301
9. Habeas corpus
Habeas corpus was denied when eight defendants were indicted in four
indictments for conspiracy to intimidate a negro from voting in an election for
a member of Congress, a different victim being named in each indictment."0 2
There was no problem of jurisdiction. Review should have been by writ of
error. Habeas corpus is improper as the "inquiry is addressed to a question
of error in the proceeding and judgment, and not to the question of whether
the judgment and sentence are void, as without jurisdiction and authority." 
3 03
In some cases the appellate court on review of a trial court decision denying
habeas corpus has reviewed the consolidation and found it proper."0
It has been stated that, where "sentences are imposed on verdicts of guilty
297 United States v. Silverman, 106 F.2d 750, 753 (3d Cir. 1939).
298 Bucklin v. United States, 159 U.S. 682 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263, 297 (1892); Rettich v. United States, 84 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir. 1936); Hostetter v.
United States, 16 F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1926); Viassis v. United States, 3 F.2d 905,,906
(9th Cir. 1925); Goldberg v. United States, 280 Fed. 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1922); Kharas v.
United States, 192 Fed. 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1911) ; Haynes v. United States, 101 Fed. 817,
818 (8th Cir. 1900). In Adams v. United States, 128 F.2d 820, 821 (5th Cir. 1942), the
appellate court considered the issue even though no objection was made until after verdict.
See also Betts v. United States, 132 Fed. 228, 230, 236 (1st Cir. 1904), where the court
relied on the statute on consolidation in civil cases.
299 Davis. v. United States, 148 F.2d 203 (5th 'Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 888 (1945);
Kharas v. United States, 192 Fed. 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1911). See United States v. Hunter,
26 Fed. Cas. 436 (No. 15425) (C.C.D.C. 1807), in which a motion to discharge the jury
from the consideration of one defendant's case was denied; a motion for a limiting instruc-
tion was also denied. See also Kettenbach v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 381 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 229 U.S. 613 (1913).
300 The prevalent view seems to have been that consolidation did not increase the num-
ber of challenges. Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 721, 732 (6th Cir. 1936); Rettich v.
United States, 84 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir. 1936); Zedd v. United States, 11 F.2d 96, 97
(4th Cir. 1926); Solomon v. United States, 297 Fed. 82, 85 (1st Cir. 1924); Kettenbach
v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 613 (1913); Kharas
v. United States, 192 Fed. 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1911); Krause v. United States, 147 Fed. 442,
446 (8th Cir. 1906). A number of courts took the position that if there was merely trial
together instead of consolidation the number of challenges increased accordingly. Rettich v.
United States, 84 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir. 1936); Callaghan v. United States, 299 Fed. 172,
175 (8th Cir. 1924).
301 Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1908).
302 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 653 (1884).
303 Howard v. United States, 75 Fed. 986, 997 (6th Cir. 1896).
304 Humphries v. Biddle, 19 F.2d 193, 195 (8th 'Cir. 1927).
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... on several indictments consolidated for trial, it is the rule that the sentences
so imposed run concurrently, in the absence of specific and definite provisions
therein that they be made to run consecutively by specifying the order of
sequence."3 "5  Habeas corpus would lie if the defendant were imprisoned
longer than the sentence provided for."
E. Right to Counsel
A defendant in a conspiracy case is deprived of the assistance of counsel,
contrary to the sixth amendment, where, over his objection, the court appoints
his counsel to also represent a co-defendant, if this is done with notice to the
judge that their interests may be inconsistent, and where the counsel's defense
of the first defendant is less effective than it might have been if he had repre-
sented that defendant alone. 0 In an earlier decision of a lower court, a trial
lawyer was assigned to act for three co-defendants who made no objection at
the time of the appointment. The court rejected the allegation of a conflict of
interest to the prejudice of the defendants as an "absurd afterthought." 0
Since 1938, a defendant has had a right to assigned counsel at the trial.
309
But since his rights even at arraignmente ° and plea .11 were dubious, and since
attack on joinder was often made prior to arraignment and plea, the right to
assigned counsel before trial probably did not exist, even after 1938. To some
extent the defendant's situation was not altogether harsh. Statistics indicate
that a federal criminal defendant does not often file pleadings other than pleas
of guilty or not guilty.31' But when he does, he certainly needs counsel, and
in many of the cases prior to 1946 the facts as set out in the decisions reveal
that he had counsel, although retained counsel.
[To be concluded in the August issue.]
305 Daugherty v. United States, 2 F.2d 691, 692 (8th Cir. 1924). While the Supreme
Court reversed on other grounds, it seemed to accept this reasoning. United States v.
Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926). See also ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST
TO APPEAL 575-77 (1947); 11 NE. L. BULL 204 (1932); 11 MINN. L. Rav. 72 (1926).
306 United States v. Patterson, 29 Fed. 775 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887). See the discussion of
this case by Chief Judge Johnsen in Young v. United States, 274 F.2d 698, 701 (8th Cir.
1960).
307 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72 (1942).
308 United States v. Rolnick, 91 F.2d 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1937).
309 Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
310 Orfield, Arraignment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 LA. L. Rav. 1, 20-22 (1959).
311 Orfield, Pleas in Federal Criminal Procedure, 35 NoTRF DAME LAWYER 1, 21-25
(1959).
312 ORFIELD, CRIMnAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 283 (1947).
